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Introduction 
Sir Gawain and the Green Knight is perhaps today the best-known and widely-read 
Middle  English  romance,  even  if  it  is  most  often  known  and  read  in  modern 
translation. The appeal of the poem lies in the anonymous poet’s skill in creating the 
poem’s  Romance  world,  that  mixes  magical  effect  with  the  performance  of  the 
chivalric ideal, and the playful laxity of courteous morality with the earnestness of the 
Christian ethic. The conventions of the Arthurian tradition and characterizations are 
recast with disarming originality, drawing the reader into the texts complexities in a 
way  that  can  be  compared  to  the  confused  perceptions  of  Gawain  himself.  The 
richness SGGK  offers modern readers many ways into the poem’s ideas, but I will 1
argue in this thesis that the thought-world in which the poet lived should not be left 
behind in modern approaches to the romance. My focus will be on a central question 
of  the  poem—the  problem  of  facing  death—contextualized  in  a  discussion  of 
medieval ways of thinking about the ethical dilemmas that the poem creates for its 
central character, Sir Gawain.
In the following thesis, I will offer a reading of the Middle English romance of 
SGGK  that  contextualises  the  poem within  the  framework of  Scholastic  thought, 2
focusing  in  particular  on  the  influence  of  the  Scholastic  discussions  of  moral 
philosophy,  in  order  to  better  understand  the  poem’s  treatment  of  moral 
indeterminacy. In the opening preface I outline my reasons for adopting this approach, 
while  also  acknowledging  that  such  a  methodology  is  not  entirely  new  in  the 
scholarship surrounding SGGK. My approach to the poem is one that focuses on a 
historical understanding of ethics that prevailed in the poet’s time, and so is historicist 
in a broad sense, but focused particularly on the history of ideas. Rather than trying to 
read  the  poem  through  the  lens  of  later  modern  philosophical  and  critical 
understandings,  I  explore how the moral  issues addressed within the poem would 
have been framed in the late fourteenth-century. Before embarking on my analysis of 
the text, I briefly consider the limitations of an emblematic, though influential school 
 In this thesis ‘Sir Gawain and the Green Knight’ is abbreviated to ‘SGGK’.1
 Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, ed. Tolkien. J. R. R. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1975).2
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of  criticism that  developed  in  the  later  twentieth  century,  and  impacted  criticism 
SGGK in various ways. I contrast my approach with this alternative mode of literary 
criticism, one that focuses more on the reader’s context as a mode of finding the idea 
of a text, and less on the author (however anonymous) and his historical milieu. To 
this  end,  I  briefly  outline  some  of  the  principal  arguments  of  Michel  Foucault, 
interrogating his argument that the author is not in fact that deep source of knowledge 
that he is often thought to be. I summarise his reasons for arguing that it is the reader 
and not the author who imparts the greater meaning to a text, a loaded approach when 
delving into early texts, written in an intellectual environment far removed from our 
own. I then examine some results of this subjective method of literary criticism in 
modern scholarship surrounding SGGK.  After outlining the limitations of some of 
these recent interpretations of the text, I suggest that these readings of the poem reveal 
more of the critic’s mind and thought world, and less of the author’s. At this juncture I 
reassert the value of familiarising oneself with the world-view of the author, in an 
attempt to better appreciate some of the principal themes developed within the text. 
My  thesis  centres  on  the  argument  that  a  familiarity  with  the  Scholastic 
approach to moral philosophy is indispensable to an authentic reading of SGGK. The 
poem’s plot focuses clearly on the moral dilemmas that Gawain is faced with, and 
wraps these in a complex of moral quandaries, making an understanding of these in 
fourteenth-century terms imperative. From this premise, I argue that it is therefore of 
great  importance  to  appreciate  how these  ethical  issues  were  conceived of  in  the 
fourteenth-century. A danger exists for the modern reader making evaluations of the 
ethical  issues  within  the  poem,  employing  assumptions  about  even  the  most 
straightforward questions of what is right or wrong. Because discussion of ideals such 
as chastity, prudence and fortitude remain significant in scholarship on SGGK, there 
exists  a  danger  that  we  might  unwittingly  impose  modern  (or  even  “timeless”) 
conceptions of these virtues on readings of the poem. It is for this reason that I argue 
the necessity of appreciating the meaning of these virtues as they were likely to have 
been conceived of by a fourteenth-century poet, who was, on the evidence of his other 
works,  strongly influenced by Scholastic thought.  His interest  in virtue and moral 
questions is less obvious in SGGK than the poet’s more overtly religious works, but 
these interests unsurprisingly pervade his Arthurian romance nevertheless. In making 
this argument I draw on some of the now unfashionable arguments and criticism of 
C.S.  Lewis,  who  restates  the  value  of  understanding  these  kinds  of  social  issues 
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within literature as they were initially conceived. In contextualising the moral ideas 
discussed  by  the  poet  I  often  refer  to  the  works  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  and  in  the 
conclusion of my preface I briefly explain why he may be considered a preeminent 
representative of the Scholastic school of thought.
At the beginning of my first chapter, I discuss the significance of the poet’s choice to 
open with  Aeneas’ flight  from the  burning city  of  Troy,  noting how this  opening 
reflects the his interest in probing attitudes the experience and awareness of mortality. 
I  argue  that  the  poet  began  by  portraying  Aeneas’ escaping  certain  death  in  his 
doomed city,  in order to frame Gawain’s own story,  who, instead of fleeing from 
death, feels morally bound to seek it out. By commencing the narrative in this way the 
poet shows that his interest is not limited to a discussion of the human struggle with 
concupiscence, but also in a deeper interest the general human will to live. In the 
section  ‘The  youthfulness  of  Arthur’,  I  draw  a  connection  between  the  childish 
depiction  of  Arthur  and  the  poem’s  wider  interest  in  mortality.  The  Trojan  hero 
presents an example of an honourable flight from death, while Arthur in his reckless 
childishness needlessly imperils his life by his rash response to the Green Knight; this 
response is then later contrasted with Gawain’s conduct, who also endangers his life 
for a ‘noble’ cause.  This important and implicit  comparison between Arthur’s and 
Gawain’s responses to the Green Knight’s challenge can only be validated if Arthur’s 
behaviour is  viewed as unbecoming of his age and station.  There are,  however,  a 
number  of  scholars  who  question  a  critical  reading  of  Arthur’s  youthfulness, 
maintaining  that  no  censure  was  intended  by  the  poet’s  description  of  his 
"childgered" attitude.  It  is  necessary in this  context  to address the various critical 
arguments that favour a positive reading of Arthur here, beside negative appraisals of 
his character. It is essential to understand the poet’s reasons for presenting Arthur’s 
behaviour as an example of rashness, for it is this conduct that serves as a foil to 
Gawain’s,  highlighting  the  inherent  contrasts  presented  by  Gawain’s  considered 
willingness to face death. 
Gawain’s willingness to die, and the properness of this attitude only become 
apparent when the poem is viewed within a contemporary ethical framework. When 
the prominence of religious themes, implicit and explicit throughout the poem, are 
downplayed, the poem’s structural integrity suffers.  Gawain’s willingness to die is 
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rendered absurd without due consideration of his religious sentiment. In the third part 
of my first chapter I identify Gawain’s legitimate fear of death: only his faith in higher 
good allows him to move beyond this fear. In making this argument I refer to the 
cultural  authority  of  Thomas  Aquinas  in  his  concise  definition  of  fortitude  and 
recklessness.  In  the  fourth  part  of  my  first  chapter  I  further  clarify  the  distinct 
difference  between  Arthur’s  and  Gawain’s  acceptance  of  the  Green  Knight’s 
challenge. I  do this by outlining Aquinas’ criteria for an authentic act of courage, 
explaining how that ‘good’ for which one faces death must be a ‘rational good’, that is 
it must be a good worth dying for. It is for this reason that Arthur’s acceptance of the 
Green Knight’s challenge cannot be deemed courageous or virtuous. I will argue that 
when he took up the challenge Arthur did so out of wounded pride, unlike Gawain, 
who endangers his life not for the sake of the court’s reputation but to preserve the life 
of his uncle King Arthur.
Discussion of Gawain’s motives in accepting the Green Knight’s challenge 
leads into reflection on his adherence to his promise to seek out the green chapel. This 
promise can be described as a ‘blind promise’ because Gawain made it when he was 
not aware of essential information regarding the person he was binding his word to, or 
the situation he is in. Susanne Thomas points out that Gawain’s oath should not have 
been considered legally binding, with reference to Aquinas’ on the binding nature of 
oaths. While it is true that in reality one would not be morally bound to such a blind 
promise, also significant is the fact that Gawain did in fact consider himself bound to 
uphold his promise. For it is through Gawain’s commitment to honouring his word, 
despite the pessimism expressed at Camelot, that the poet presents the problematic 
importance of justice for its own sake. This exposition of justice can be compared 
with Plato’s in The Republic, as both writers use similar devices to explore the ideal 
of justice in its purest form.
With Gawain’s acceptance of the Green Knight’s challenge and his departure 
for the Green Chapel the first three cardinal virtues, prudence, justice and fortitude are 
explored in their various dimensions. However, it is not until he is visited by Lady 
Bertilak that his temperance is tested. In this context we discover the poet’s intention 
to explore the tensions between the various virtues that Gawain strives to uphold. 
Derek Pearsall has argued that the contrivance of the story reveals the contradictions 
within the chivalric  code.  I  discuss  how the image of  the pentangle  on Gawain’s 
shield reflects Aquinas’ understanding of the interconnectedness of each of its virtues, 
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showing that no virtue can stand alone, but must always be informed by prudence, 
reaffirming the idea the Gawain’s shield reflects a Thomistic analysis of virtue. 
The primary focus of chapter one is an exploration of the various ways that the 
Scholastically influenced poet conceptualised the four cardinal virtues, and how this 
may be seen within the narrative structure of the poem. My first chapter concludes by 
addressing  the  broader  theme  of  the  poem  that  pervades  the  entire  text,  that  is 
Gawain’s attitude towards his own death. He struggles to live out the ideals of moral 
perfection emblazoned on his shield. But his greatest challenge is in assuming a fitting 
attitude towards his own death. My chapter concludes by looking at how Boethius’ 
ideas in The Consolation of Philosophy may have influenced the thought of the poet 
and his treatment of death within the poem. 
In  the  first  part  of  my  second  chapter,  I  address  the  poet’s  depiction  of 
Gawain’s  temperance,  showing  how  his  behaviour  exemplifies  a  Scholastic 
understanding of temperance. I begin by addressing the possible narrative reasons for 
Gawain’s restraint towards Lady Bertilak’s sexual advances. Carol Dinshaw suggests 
that his restraint is due to the wager with Lord Bertilak, whereby anything Gawain 
wins he must extend to his host. While this playful situation is crafted by the poet, on 
analysis it is unlikely that this is the chief motivation for Gawain’s chaste response. 
To support this claim I refer to the poet’s observably serious intention of exploring the 
perfection of virtues, emphasized by Gawain’s shield.  Lady Bertilak also suggests 
reasons for Gawain’s abstinence, but these can be discounted as revealing his true 
motive, as Gawain himself does when she questions him. The situation requires an 
understanding of  the Scholastic  understanding of  temperance (I  draw on Aquinas’ 
classic  definition),  showing  how  restraint  must  be  directed  towards  a  noble  and 
worthy  good  if  the  act  is  to  be  called  truly  temperate.  With  this  definition  of 
temperance I explain why it was so important that the poet show that Gawain refused 
the lady for nothing but the highest motives. I compare this use of narrative structure, 
making explicit the nuanced understanding of temperance, with the poet’s depiction 
of fortitude in the first fitt, by means of contrasting Gawain’s and Arthur’s acceptance 
of  the  Green  Knight’s  challenge.  The  Lady’s  proffered  reasons  for  Gawain’s 
continence  contrast  significantly  with  his  higher  motive,  providing  a  clearer 
understanding of authentic temperance. 
This method of contrasting virtue with vice is further played out in the poet’s 
portrayal of Gawain’s humility. In the second part of my second chapter I discuss 
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Gawain’s  progression  from  false  humility  to  an  authentic  estimation  of  himself. 
Bernard of Clairvaux teaches that true humility is the virtue that allows one to have an 
exact knowledge of oneself. It is my argument that the self-deprecating arguments 
that Gawain makes in order to navigate the difficult situations with the Green Knight 
and Lady Bertilak are not meant to epitomise authentic humility. I refer to Aquinas’ 
and  Bonaventure’s  definitions  of  humility,  explaining  that  they  both  agree  that 
humility  lay  not  in  the  self-abasement  that  Gawain  demonstrated,  but  rather  in 
possessing a true self-knowledge, and this proves to be the very quality Gawain lacks. 
It is this same defect that the poet wishes to highlight in his characterisation. One of 
the  essential  aspects  of  Gawain’s  character  development  is  the  framing  of  his 
departure from and return to court: he leaves embracing the shield that emblemizes 
his  sense of  his  own perfection,  while upon his  return he wears the green girdle, 
symbolizing his own sense of failure. The poet’s use of these symbols of the shield 
and girdle contrasts false and true humility, echoing the contrast of true courage and 
temperance revealed by initially showing what they were not. 
In  the  third  part  of  my second chapter  I  return  to  the  poet’s  treatment  of 
temperance as shown through Gawain’s final visit from Lady Bertilak. It is in this 
final episode with the lady that the poet captures the essence of authentic temperance. 
The  Lady  suggests  that  Gawain’s  restraint  is  motived  by  his  fidelity  to  another 
woman. It is of great significance that Gawain denies this claim. It is essential to the 
poet’s treatment of temperance that Gawain’s chastity be motived by nothing other 
than a  love of  virtue for  its  own sake and ordered disdain towards that  which is 
immoral.  Scholastic  thinkers  argued  that  an  act  of  restraint  for  any  lesser  reason 
cannot be accurately defined as temperate. The poet reasserts this view in Gawain’s 
final refusal of Lady Bertilak. Derek Pearsall  asserts that Gawain’s faith is not an 
integral aspect of poet’s focus, but merely a convention of his age. In response to this 
curiously ahistorical view, I reread the climactic point in the story, as Gawain is close 
to wavering in his chaste resolve. The poet notes the evil it would bring upon his soul, 
should he succumb to the temptation. In this context, we see that Gawain’s faith is in 
fact the motivating logic behind each of his virtuous acts throughout the story. 
The second chapter concludes with discussion of the ambiguous ending of the 
poem.  I  offer  an  argument  towards  understanding  why  the  poet  leaves  off  the 
narrative with such a morally indeterminate conclusion. Throughout the story the poet 
shows such  clear  distinctions  between virtue  and  vice,  and  yet  at  the  end  of  the 
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narrative  it  is  unclear  how  seriously  his  fault  of  retaining  the  girdle  should  be 
interpreted. J.R.R. Tolkien maintains that this indefinite conclusion is intentionally 
created by the poet, and is in fact central to the poem’s general interest in morality. 
The  poet’s  didactic  intention  is  expanded  rather  than  reduced  by  the  ambiguous 
ending. By it he shows the complexities of the morality, revealing that though there is 
a concrete moral reality, our ability to evaluate our own conduct or those of others can 
never be perfect. Tolkien is not arguing for moral relativism reading of the poem, but 
he  does  show  the  poet’s  multifaceted  understanding  of  morality.  I  summarise 
Tolkien’s argument of the three systems of rules that Gawain attempts to live by. The 
rules of morality, the rules of courtesy and the rules of the game prescribed by the 
Green Knight. The central tension of the poem lies in Gawain’s attempt to adhere to 
these often-conflicting set of rules. The conclusion of this reading of SGGK refers to 
the  authority  of  Aquinas  to  resolve  the  ambiguity  of  the  poem’s  ending.  Thomas 
makes the distinction between worldly fear and godly fear,  and explains why any 
misconduct  performed  out  of  worldly  fear  is  a  fault.  Aquinas’ ethics  clarify  the 
different  moral  plains  that  Gawain  and  his  fellow  Knights  operate  on,  and  this 
difference clarifies some of the seeming ambiguities of the poem’s end, revealing a 
reasonableness in Gawain’s self-condemnation. The harshness of his self-evaluation 
reflects  the  uncompromising  ideal  of  moral  perfection  that  is  so  much  a  part  of 
Aquinas’ thought. 
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Chapter 1
Preface
In the following chapter, I will offer a reading of SGGK which locates my literary 
approach in a school of criticism that is neither new nor currently fashionable. The 
approach I take incorporates aspects of historicism—not unusual in medieval literary 
criticism—and I also embrace the belief that it is possible, through close and careful 
reading of the poem, to understand not only something of what the author intended to 
convey in meaning to his contemporary readers, but also the ideals that underpin his 
approach. This, I  will  argue, is grounded on the thought of Scholastic philosophy, 
applied to questions of moral conduct. The suggestion that the moral hermeneutic of 
the poem emerges within a Scholastic frame is not new,  nor is the suggestion that the 3
poet  is  deeply  interested  in  the  tension  between  human  weakness  and  Christian 
ideals.  But before I turn to the question of what might be characterized as the poem’s 4
ethic,  I  wish to  consider,  in  an emblematic  way,  some challenges  to  this  kind of 
approach  presented  by  ways  of  approaching  the  poem in  some  recent  influential 
studies. These might generally be understood as embracing the style of criticism that 
has grown out of the marriage of Marx and Freud,  and perhaps most clearly and 5
popularly articulated by Michel Foucault.
Michel  Foucault  can  represent  the  epitome,  and  he  was  certainly  a  most 
influential  proponent,  of  what  could  be  called  the  “subjective”  interpretation  of 
literature. In his work What is an Author?, he argues that any purpose or intention that 
readers  ascribe to the author is  in  fact  a  projection of  their  own view points  and 
biases.  The  attempt  to  uncover  an  understanding  of  the  author’s  beliefs  through 
contextualising  the  period  that  he  wrote  in,  is  a  method  of  literary  analysis  that 
Foucault seeks to discredit: 
 Larry D. Benson, Art and Tradition in “Sir Gawain and the Green Knight” (New Brunswick, NJ: 3
Rutgers UP, 1965), 827.
 Derek Brewer, "Romance Traditions and Christian Values in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight", 4
in Christianity and Romance in Medieval England, ed. Rosalind Field, Phillipa Hardman, and Michelle 
Sweeney, (London: Boydell and Brewer, 2010), 50-58.
 T Eagleton, Marxism and Literary Criticism (London: Routledge, 2002), 7.5
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Critics doubtless try to give this being of reason a realistic 
status, by discerning, in the individual, a "deep" motive, a 
"creative" power, or a "design," the milieu in which writing 
originates.  Nevertheless,  these  aspects  of  an  individual 
which  we  designate  as  making  him an  author  are  only  a 
projection,  in  more  or  less  psychologizing  terms,  of  the 
operations  we force  texts  to  undergo,  the  connections  we 
make, the traits we establish as pertinent, the continuities we 
recognize, or the exclusions we practice.6
While I would reject the assertion that understanding a literary work is simple a study 
in  self-analysis,  Foucault’s  argument  does  serve  as  an  important  warning  against 
Romantic notions of regarding canonical authors as inspired geniuses—a flaw, as we 
will see, can be found in some criticism of SGGK.  The attempt to uncover the deeper 7
motives of the author is one that Foucault sees as dispensable, if not impossible, it is 
the  work  and  not  the  author  that  the  critic  should  seek  to  understand.  Foucault 
launches his attack on the “author” with the weapons of structuralism, as the “author” 
is hidden by the voice of the “narrator”, a textual layering that relegates the reader to 
an insuperable distance from the text’s originating voice. The author’s importance is 
minimised by explaining that the voice of the “author” inscribed as the “narrator” of 
the story should be regarded as quite distinct in identity from the actual person who 
wrote the text. The person writing may assume a set of beliefs as the author, that he as 
a  person  might  not  personally  maintain.  For  instance  the  authorial  voice  of  Les 
Miserables might seem to offer sanctimonious reverence towards the virtue of purity, 
and yet it is quite likely that Victor Hugo himself personally revered purity to a much 
lesser extent.  Because of this  disconnect  between the voice of the author and an 8
historical person’s actual beliefs, Foucault asserts that it is far less important, as well 
as futile, to attempt to discern the true meaning of the author.  It is unclear what such 9
an approach could mean when reading the works of an anonymous author such as the 
Gawain-poet, though undoubtedly some critics have made the mistake of believing 
they know even this author’s deeper thoughts. That is not my intention, I will attempt 
to stay close to the text of the poem. 
 Michel Foucault and Paul Rabinow, ‘What is an author?’ The Foucault Reader, (New York: Vintage 6
Books, 1984, 2010), 313.
 George J. Engelhardt, The Predicament of Gawain (London: Duke of University Press, 1955), 7.7
 Samuel Edwards, Victor Hugo: A Biography. (London: New English Library, 1975), 13.8
 Ibid., 299. 9
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Foucault departs from the popular, and clearly naive, opinion that meaning is 
only inherent in the text; rather, it is the work of the critic to uncover any meaning 
that might inhere. He attests rather that a text’s ideas are already in their form within 
the reader and the story is a kind of canvas that allows the reader to give matter to that 
form. Foucault discourages the school of thought that views the author as a source of 
“deep  knowledge”  that  might  speak  in  general  to  the  human  condition,  with  a 
meaning that can endure across time and place, wherever the text might be read. The 
author, he suggests, should not be assumed to have any profound degree of depth that 
is so often ascribed to the great writers. Instead, the author should only be thought of 
as the mediator of ideas that are already available to all people, and any prolonged 
focus  on  the  author,  rather  than  just  the  work  itself,  will  limit  and  constrain  the 
discussion of ideas:  
The author is the principal of thrift  in the proliferation of 
meaning. As a result, we must entirely reverse the traditional 
idea  of  the  author.  We  are  accustomed,  as  we  have  seen 
earlier,  to saying that the author is the genial creator of a 
work  in  which  he  deposits,  with  infinite  wealth  and 
generosity, an inexhaustible world of significations. We are 
used to thinking that the author is so different from all other 
men, and so transcendent with regard to all languages that, 
as  soon  as  he  speaks,  meaning  begins  to  proliferate,  to 
proliferate indefinitely.  The truth is quite the contrary: the 
author is not an indefinite source of significations that fill a 
work; the author does not precede the works; he is a certain 
functional  principal  by  which,  in  our  culture,  one  limits, 
excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the 
free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, 
decomposition, and recomposition of fiction.10
It may then be said that the truths of the literary text are whatever the critic succeeds 
in drawing from it. Foucault speaks of his hope that literary scholarship will focus less 
and less on the author, and more on the reader’s own experience. By appropriating 
such an approach he suggests that critics will be moved to ask the more meaningful 
and enlightening questions.
We  would  no  longer  hear  the  questions  that  have  been 
rehashed for so long: Who really spoke? Is it really he and 
not  someone  else?  With  what  authenticity  or  originality? 
And  what  part  of  his  deepest  self  did  he  express  in  his 
discourse?  Instead,  there  would  be  other  questions,  like 
these:  What are the modes of existence of this discourse? 
Where has it been used, how can it circulate, and who can 
appropriate it for himself? What are the places in it where 
 Ibid., 313.10
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there is room for possible subjects? Who can assume these 
various subject  functions? And behind all  these questions, 
we  would  hear  hardly  anything  but  the  stirring  of  an 
indifference:  What  difference  does  it  make  who  is 
speaking?”11
Some of the questions Foucault places in the mouths of his contemporaries evoke for 
us  an  earlier,  mid-twentieth-century  age  of  literary  criticism,  that  had  become 
preoccupied  with  textual  criticism  to  the  extent  that  it  replaced  any  attempt  at 
meaningful engagement with literature as literary. However, the danger inherent in a 
wholesale relegation of historicising questions about medieval texts is that, uncoupled 
from any determinative sense of their own time and place, critical readings of them 
can render them as authorless receptacles of critical fancy. 
Taken to its illogical extreme, the kind of approach outlined by Foucault can 
leave us with an abundance of modern ideals and social interests being superimposed 
upon the ambivalent  text.  For  example,  Carolyn Dinshaw argues for  a  reading of 
SGGK that sees in it not only the examination of homosocial bonds, but homosexual 
eroticism. She accepts that such a reading may not have been directly intended by the 
poet, yet affirms that such a reading remains valid.
When, then, Gawain kisses Bertilak we ought not allow the 
heterosexual ideology of the poem to render unintelligible to 
us the fulfilment of their exchange bargain, a fulfilment that 
is right before our eyes: two men kissing feelingly, solemnly, 
seriously.12
Catherine S. Cox also uses the poem to inform her thoughts on gender theory.  This 13
is not to say that all of modern society’s interests are absent from the poem’s thought-
world, however differently conceived. Jill Mann, with a more convincing historical 
approach, argues for a political  reading of the poem, showing how the decadence 
described in Arthur and Bertilak’s court reflects the extravagance of Richard II’s own 
court.  Joseph Taylor sees in the poem a discussion on the legal indeterminacy of 14
 Ibid., 314.11
 Carolyn Dinshaw “Volume Information,” Diacritics 24, no. 4 (1994): 79-83. 12
 Catherine S. Cox, “Genesis and Gender in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight”, in The Chaucer 13
Review, Volume 25, number 4, (2001): 378-390.
 Jill Mann, “Courtly Aesthetics and Courtly Ethics in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight,” Studies in 14
the Age of Chaucer 31, no. 1, (2009): 231-265.
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verbal contracts,  Lynn Arner offers a colonialist reading of the poem,  while Derek 15 16
Pearsall,  less  convincingly,  attempts  a  completely  secular  reading  of  SGGK  that 
ignores the pervasive, obvious and totally unsurprising influence of Christianity on 
the poem’s conceptions.17
These forms of more subjective literary analysis reveal much of the critic’s 
own thoughts and world view, but generally less of the author’s, at times sacrificing 
historical plausibility on the altar of contemporary relevance. It must, however, be 
freely  admitted  that  it  is  difficult  to  wholly  remove  one’s  biases,  and  make  a 
completely objective reading of the poem. Oscar Wilde recognises this truth when he 
says that  all  literary criticism is a form of autobiography.  However,  in a world 18
where  people  are  in  fact  capable  of  meaningful  communicating  with  each  other 
through writing, some objectivity may still be hoped for in criticism and the process 
of reflecting upon the literary form in which a writer chose to convey ideas, as well as 
the context in which medieval texts were written. The broad range of themes that 
literary  texts  address  makes  it  difficult  to  ascertain,  with  any  certitude,  the  full 
intentions of any author. The historians will vary in their conclusions, but they are 
united by their  focus on human action,  philosophers similarly concern themselves 
with  ideas,  and  theologians  with  divinity.  The  challenge  that  arises  in  analysing 
literature, in particular medieval literature, is that the poets are often concerned with 
all three.  If any objectivity is to be hoped for then, in studying medieval literature 19
the  critic  can  benefit  from  familiarising  him-  or  herself  with  the  theologies, 
philosophies and social ideas of that era. To this end I have titled the following thesis 
Scholasticism in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight; not because the Gawain-poet was 
himself a Scholastic, but rather because I believe that in understanding the influence 
of  Scholasticism,  one  may  better  appreciate  the  moral  thought  of  the  poem.  No 
 Joseph Taylor. “Sovereignty, Oath, and the Profane Life in the Avowing of Arthur,” 15
in Exemplaria 25, no. 1 (2013):  36-58. 
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Jonathan Gibson, (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer Ltd, 1997), 17.
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reading can ever recapture the fullness of a deep historical moment, but this does not 
mean that all efforts in this direction are either futile or meaningless.
The danger that presents itself in a critical approach focused on the “ideal” in 
a text remains that of ironing out or ignoring historical difference. Such an approach 
might suggest that in studying a text such as SGGK that explores concepts of moral 
virtue, one need only familiarise oneself with a general understanding of ethics, rather 
than a detailed study of moral philosophy as it was understood in the middle ages. 
C.S.  Lewis  comments  on  the  dangers  inherent  to  a  methodological  approach that 
looks only at those parts of a text that resonate with our own time and values:
According to this  method the things which separate  one 
age from another are superficial. Just as, if we stripped the 
armour  off  a  medieval  knight  or  the  lace  of  a  Caroline 
courtier, we should find beneath them an anatomy identical 
with our own, so, it is held, if we strip off from Virgil his 
Roman imperialism, from Sidney his code of honour, from 
Lucretius his Epicurean philosophy, and from all who have 
it  their  religion,  we  shall  find  the  Unchanging  Human 
Heart, and on this we are to concentrate.20
Lewis says that  by disregarding the ideals  and philosophies  of  a  former age,  and 
focusing only on the similitudes, one misses a significant aspect of literary criticism. 
The richness of a text is reduced if we focus only on that which resounds with modern 
thought.  This  selective  approach stands  in  danger  of  highlighting  that  which  was 
perhaps  not  the  main intention of  the  poem.  To counter  this  danger  Lewis  offers 
another method of reading literature: 
Instead of stripping the knight of his armour you can try to 
put  his  armour  on  yourself:  instead  of  seeing  how  the 
courter would look without his lace, you can try to see how 
you would feel with his lace….21
Rather than ignoring the dissimilarities dividing two ages, and resigning ourselves to 
belief  that  an  essential  otherness  in  medieval  texts,  I  am interested  in  trying  the 
experiment advocated by Lewis. That is, I will attempt an understanding of some of 
those particularities that delineate a former world-view from our own. It is for this 
reason  that  the  discussion  of  this  thesis  will  focus  closely  on  the  influence  of 
Scholastic thought on the moral framework of SGGK.  The reader, I suggest, cannot 
 C.S. Lewis, A Preface to Paradise Lost (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 62.20
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properly evaluate this kind of medieval poem, that treats ideas of virtue and vice so 
explicitly,  without first  recovering an awareness of how its late fourteenth-century 
poet,  undoubtedly  formed  in  the  theological  questions  and  methods  of  his  age, 
understood moral theology.22
The following discussion of Scholastic thought includes a particular focus on 
the works of Thomas Aquinas, not because other medieval theologians deserve less 
attention,  but  because Aquinas’ pre-eminence and universal  influence allows us to 
treat him as the most influential representative of that school of thought.  In seeking a 23
clearer  understanding  of  the  Gawain-poet’s  world-view  it  might  seem curious  to 
consult a theologian who lived a century earlier, though as C.S. Lewis has argued, this 
school  of  thought  and  its  ideas  took  time  to  impact  other  cultural  forms,  like 
literature.   I will argue that a close analysis of the moral conflict in SGGK reveals 24
this influence of the broad outlines of Aquinas’ formulations of moral philosophy. 
Before making a close analysis, however, it is worth noting more general points of 
connection that reflect this Scholastic influence on the poem. A common theme in any 
discussion  of  Scholasticism is  the  unification  of  faith  and  reason,  that  Aquinas 25
championed; he affirmed that the tenets of the Christian faith never could or would 
never oppose what reason showed to be true.  He was a firm proponent of the idea 26
that faith and reason together will lead a person to truth. It is not coincidental that in 
SGGK  fides  (faith)  is  often  brought  into  an  apparent  tension  with  ratio  (reason). 
Gawain’s faith impels him to be ever loyal to his trouthe, this loyalty is problematized 
by his reason that tells him to do whatever will preserve his self. Reason inclines him 
to stay in the safety of Camelot, while faith suggests he should honour his word and 
seek out the Green Chapel.  Faith tells  him to trust  in God, rather than a magical 
girdle, given as a love token by a married woman, reason tells him to accept anything 
that might save him from the Green Knight’s axe. The poet draws faith and reason 
into play, with questions of virtue, honour, courtesy and chivalry, showing how the 
tensions among them intersect.
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This critical approach of looking at the moral dimensions SGGK  through a 
Thomistic lens in order to better understand how the poet’s moral anthropology and 
especially his  characterisation of  the hero,  is  an established one that  has received 
recent new attention. David N. Beauregard offers a Thomistic reading of the poem in, 
showing how Aquinas’ definition of fortitude influenced the poet’s depiction of that 
virtue.  In an earlier study, Gerald Morgan also drew on Thomistic thought in his Sir 27
Gawain and the Green Knight and the Idea of Righteousness. In his preface to the 
book he explains the reasons why he considers the works of Aquinas so significant 
towards a correct understanding of SGGK:
All  texts  have  been  shaped  by  their  historical 
context, so that at some point it is necessary to go 
beyond the text to the larger context of ideas that 
have  informed  it.  I  have  gone  to  the  context  of 
medieval  scholasticism,  and  especially  to  the 
thought  of  its  most  distinguished  representative, 
Aquinas,  in  order  to  grasp  the  ideas  that  are 
imaginatively  significant  in  Sir  Gawain  and  the 
Green Knight. 28
The intention of  this  thesis  will  be  to  analyse  the  poem,  with  the  view of  better 
understanding how it would have originally been read in the fourteenth-century, rather 
than imposing ahistorical readings on the text. It is the less likely that the poet’s ideas 
will be misconstrued, if the literary critic attempts to approach the text from the world 
view that prevailed at the time of the poem’s composition. With this view in mind, I 
will develop, extend and consolidate aspects of Gerald Morgan’s approach to SGGK, 
with  an  examination,  through  a  Thomistic  lens,  of  the  tensions  inherent  in  the 
prudential practice of courage and chastity.
1.1 Aeneas 
It is not an unfair characterisation to suggest that the many critics of Sir Gawain and 
the Green Knight  have struggled to find any deep meaning in the poem’s opening 
allusion  to  the  siege  at  Troy,  and  especially  the  significance  of  the  reference  to 
 David N. Beauregard, “Moral Theology in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight: The Pentangle, the 27
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Aeneas,  the  first  hero  mentioned  in  the  poem.  The  myth  of  Trojan  origin  is 
undoubtedly  of  great  importance  for  the  history  of  chivalry  as  understood  in  the 
Middle Ages, but Aeneas himself emerges as a deeply problematic character, and one 
who offers important insights into the moral crises faced across the poem by Gawain 
himself. The implicit logic of introducing Aeneas at the poem’s opening connects the 
chivalric deeds of Arthur’s court with the glory of Troy, through Aeneas’ descendant 
Brutus:
Siþen þe sege and þe assaut watz at Troye,
þe borȝ brittened and brent to bodndez and askez,
þe tulk þat þe trammes of tresoun þer wroȝt
Watz tried for his tricherie, þe trewest on erthe:
Hit watz Ennias þe athel, and his highe kynde,
þat siþen depreced prouinces, and patrounes bicome
Welneȝe of al þe wele in þe west iles. (1- 7)
As  the  story  progresses,  however,  more  subtle  and  significant  reasons  for  the 
introduction of Aeneas present themselves. George Sanderlin notes that both heroes 
must rebuff the enticement of a lady in order to fulfil their quest.  In Sir Gawain and 29
the  Green Knight,  however,  and unlike the Aeneid,  the  “lovers”  and the hunt  are 
separated out into two temporally interwoven sets of episodes, and the encounter in 
the “cave” is reserved for Gawain alone in the Green Chapel. 
This kind of structural parallel is developed across the poem, an aspect of the 
poet’s technique observed by Pamela Gradon:
The Challenge is made on New Year’s Day; 
the  requital  is  given  on  New  Year’s  Day. 
Life at the Green Knight’s court is equally 
symmetrical. We have three evening parties, 
three  temptation  scenes,  three  hunting 
scenes.  Moreover,  each  hunting  scene  is 
used as a kind of frame for the equivalent 
temptation scene.30
The parallels between the hunting and temptation scenes reveal the nature of the game 
Gawain finds himself in. He is not the master of the situation; he is rather the one 
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being hunted . The deer reflects the quick and nimble thinking Gawain requires to 31
respond to the lady’s rhetorical tricks, the boar shows the strength of will required in 
refusing  her,  and  the  fox  the  cunningness  needed  to  escape  her  final  attempts  of 
seduction. These implicit parallels between Gawain and the animals, involved in the 
hunt, suggest the possibility of other parallels that the poet wishes his readers to draw 
between Gawain and Aeneas. If the poem’s introduction is to be considered more than 
an arbitrary reference Virgil’s epic, then it should be assumed that the poet intends an 
important parallel between his Trojan and Arthurian heroes. 
Sanderlin  argues  that  the  basis  of  the  poet’s  comparison  is  the  trials  that 
Aeneas faced in his love for Dido, beside Gawain’s temptation from Lady Bertilak. 
The focus, in this light, is their struggle with sexual appetite.  However, if this aspect 32
of the comparison were the poet’s main interest, it would seem more appropriate that 
the poet should have begun his narrative with Aeneas fleeing Carthage. But he begins 
carefully and hardly accidentally with Aeneas’ flight from the burning city of Troy, 
where he chooses to escape death—he is fleeing no seduction here. The choice to 
commence his narrative with this scene—one of the most famous in history—suggests 
that the poet’s main interest in Aeneas is focused on his choice of flight over certain 
death,  a  blend  of  destiny  with  prudence  that  cuts  to  the  heart  of  Gawain’s  own 
dilemma. Undoubtedly Gawain struggles against desires of the flesh, but the context 
in which these arise is his profound awareness of his impending death, and his flesh’s 
strongest desire for life. By recognising his fear of death, and the impact of this on his 
self-understanding  as  a  knight,  Gawain  discovers  a  deeper  self-awareness.  Gerald 
Morgan comments:
The opening lines of the poem are thus not 
only  logical  and  clear,  but  also  reveal  a 
complexity  that  we  shall  find  to  be 
characteristic of the poet’s moral thinking in 
general.33
Morgan argues that the trials Aeneas faced with the loss of his city, eventuate in the 
glory of founding Rome, and so in a similar way, Gawain is faced with the prospect of 
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losing his life, instead discovers a deeper self-realization.  Morgan’s reading of poem 34
presents a credible argument for considering why the poet decided to begin his poem 
with the fall of Troy.
However,  a  more  telling  comparison  is  to  be  drawn between  Gawain  and 
Aeneas,  focused  on  the  particular  historical  circumstance  and  its  inherent  moral 
struggle, that the poet highlights. Aeneas has the choice to live, but he must abandon 
the city he loves, in superficial terms choosing the coward’s path away from battle and 
the burning city. Likewise, Gawain is also presented with a chance to live in the shape 
of the girdle. His departure from Arthur’s court and city to face his destiny seems 
courageous,  but  the  real  departure  that  will  challenge him is  from his  own sense 
trouthe, if he is to live. The contrast in the heroes’ responses to death is not intended 
to vilify Aeneas. It could hardly be thought cowardly to flee a doomed city already in 
flames. Indeed, the poet describes Aeneas as ‘the trewest on erthe’ (3). In Gawain’s 
situation he is, however, bound, by his blind promise, to refrain from fleeing death. 
The  danger  that  besets  both  heroes  is  similar,  yet  the  differing  circumstances 
necessitate  alternative  responses.  It  may  then  be  seen,  that  by  commencing  his 
narrative with Aeneas’ flight from death, the poet gives his story a memento mori 
framework. And it is this theme, Morgan says, that reflects the poet’s moral thought 
throughout the poem. In this light, the ethics of facing death move to the centre of the 
poem, and with it the tension between prudential caution and courage.  35
1.2 The youthfulness of Arthur
This tension is further played out in the character of Arthur at the banquet when he 
impulsively accepts the Green Knight’s challenge. This lack of caution and discretion 
furthers  the poet’s  exposition on attitudes towards death.  The entire  poem centres 
around death and the differing attitudes towards it. In the description of Aeneas “Þe 
trewest on erthe” (4) fleeing Troy, the poet presents one significant example showing 
that in some circumstances it might be fitting to flee from death. Arthur’s character 
reveals the inherent flaw of treating death too lightly, and not practicing due caution. 
And in Gawain’s acceptance of the Green Knight’s game and eventual departure for 
the Green Chapel, the poet shows that in particular circumstances it is perhaps more 
 Ibid., 46.34
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fitting deliberately to imperil one’s own life, if it means the attaining of a higher good 
such  as  preserving  another.  The  poet’s  way  of  bringing  these  three  contrasting 
attitudes towards death is rooted in his handling of Arthur’s conduct in the context of 
the  game,  which  is  carefully  described.  The  poet’s  vocabulary  allows  the  reader 
enough freedom to weigh up Arthur’s conduct and compare it with Gawain’s, without 
creating a simplistic opposition between virtue and vice. If it was in fact the intention 
of the poet to reflect in the character of Arthur an example of recklessness, then it is 
worth  noting  the  way  in  which  he  does  this.  Arthur  is  described  as  acting  very 
youthful,  and  it  is  this  youthfulness  that  the  poet  invites  us  to  evaluate.  Arthur 
demonstrates  his  boyishness  by insisting on being entertained before enjoying his 
meal:
He wolde neuer ete
Vpon such a dere day er hym deuised were
Of sum auenturus þyng an vncoþe tale,
of sum mayn meuayle, þat he myȝt trawe…(91 – 94)
Arthur’s behaviour is entirely conventional within the literary tradition, but here it is 
inflected and problematised by the poet. The king’s custom was an established part of 
the tradition within the corpus of Arthurian tales. The thirteenth-century German poet 
Der Stricker describes Arthur’s custom:
He vowed, for the sake of his comrades’ good name, 
that he would each and every day refrain from food 
until  such  time  as  he  should  hear  of  —  or  else 
witness himself — a new tale of some deed worth 
recounting.  36
Similarly, Jaufre’s twelfth-century Occitan poem also presents Arthur declaring:
You know full well, for you have seen it many times, 
that I will not eat for anything, no matter how long I 
must hold court, until an adventure comes, or some 
strange news of a knight or maiden.37
In all three narratives the king insists that he be entertained before he breaks his fast. 
However, a more significant commonality across them is the form of entertainment 
that Arthur demands. All three poets describe Arthur as wishing to hear a story or 
witness  some marvel.   It  is  significant  that  in  SGGK  the  poet  emphasizes  a  new 
 Der Stricker, Daniel von dem blühenden Tal (London: Olms Verlag, 2013), 40.36
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condition:  that  the  story  or  marvel  must  be  trawe (“true”,  “truthful”).  The  poet’s 
playful irony is in evidence as a character within a Romance narrative full of marvels 
should demand to hear a story that is true, but there is also a deeper significance in 
Arthur’s demand for a trawe story. For Trawþe is the theme upon which the whole 
narrative centers.  The conflict is generated by Gawain’s struggle to remain true to 38
his word. It is important to note that, though Arthur stipulated that the marvel or story 
be one of truth, what he finds is far removed from it, as the court and the reader are 
drawn  into  an  elaborate  game  where  nothing  is  at  seems--the  Green  Knight’s 
Christmas game rests on both magic and deception. The court cannot know that the 
challenge is a plot orchestrated by Morgen le Fay, targeted against Guinevere. Nor can 
the court or reader know that there would be further levels of deception within the 
game. It is this pervasive untruthfulness of the game, when revealed at the end of the 
story, that serves to highlight the Gawain’s own self-deception.  39
The Gawain-poet describes Arthur and his court as youthful and spirited, “he 
þe  comlokest  kyng  þat  þe  court  haldes;  for  al  watz  þis  fayre  folk  in  her  first 
age…” (53) The story is set in the early days of Arthur’s rule when “he watz so joly of 
his joyfnes, and sumquat childgered…” (86) J.R.R. Tolkien and E.V. Gordon gloss 
childgered as ‘boyish merriment’ or ‘youthfulness’. And yet though the joyful vitality 
of youth would seem a positive quality, J. J. Anderson argues that the word is used by 
the poet with a tone of censure:
  "childgered" may not mean precisely "childish," but 
there is nevertheless a derogatory implication that he 
is not yet fully adult in his ways, and "brayn wylde" 
suggests thoughts which are over-impulsive.40
Anderson  further  argues  that  Arthur  demonstrates  his  childishness  in  wilfully 
allowing his knights to endanger their lives for the sake of entertainment:41
To joyne wyth hym in iustyng, in joparde to lay, 
Lede, lif for lyf, leue vchon oþer,
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As fortune wolde fulsun hom, þe fayrer to haue. 
(97 – 99)
It is true that as early as 1139 Pope Innocent III, at the Second Lateran Council, had 
condemned the practice of jousting:
We  entirely  forbid,  moreover,  those  abominable 
jousts  and  tournaments  in  which  knights  come 
together  by  agreement  and  rashly  engage  in 
showing off their physical prowess and daring, and 
which often result in human deaths and danger to 
souls.42
This edict was, however, to a large extent ignored throughout the Middle Ages , and 43
when the poet mentions the chivalric games, there is no obvious or overt censure. The 
poet’s  description  of  the  jousting  offers  little  evidence  to  suggest  that  he  was 
moralizing against such dangerous sport in the way that Pope Innocent III had. If 
Arthur’s youthfulness was a fault,  it  was not because he permitted his knights to 
endanger  themselves  through  games  of  prowess.  Anderson’s  critique  of  Arthur’s 
childgered nature nevertheless warrants further evaluation. The term invites a wide 
range of possible interpretations, and in evaluating the portrayal of Arthur’s character, 
it  is  necessary  to  explore  the  sense  in  which  the  poet  used  it.  There  is  also 
undoubtedly an intentional ambiguity in the poet’s description of Arthur’s youthful 
nature. Enough remains unsaid that the reader must think carefully about Arthur’s 
maturity and conduct.
Questions of propriety, fittingness and conduct constitute a central theme of 
the  poem.  The  prominence  of  ideal  conduct  as  a  concern  in  the  poem  is 44
demonstrated by Gawain’s first speech. Before seeking to dissuade Arthur from the 
Green Knight’s game he asks permission of Guinevere to rise from the table, and 
permission from Arthur to stand by his side. And when he makes his argument, his 
first appeal is to the impropriety and un-fittingness of the challenge. This opening 
speech demonstrates the poet’s interest in exploring ideas of acting in a way that is 
fitting to one’s state.  J. A. Burrow affirms the centrality of this theme, noting the 
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frequent  use  of  such  adjectives  as  ‘becoming’,  ‘meet’,  ‘kind’,  ‘seemly’  etc.  45
Fittingness  is  an  essential  quality  of  propriety,  that  in  turn  is  fundamental  to  the 
chivalric virtue of courtesy, and it is this virtue of courtesy that is so central to the 
theme of the poem. Burrow defines the criteria for fittingness or seemliness, noting:
For a man’s dress, speech or conduct to be praiseworthy, 
it  must  be  appropriate  –  appropriate,  that  is,  to  such a 
variable  factors  as  his  age  and  social  position,  the 
occasion and his part in it, and the season of the year.46
The question must then be asked whether Arthur’s behaviour was fitting to his age 
state in life. He is described with a youthful restlessness and an unconstrained vitality 
of spirit:
 
He watz so joly of his joyfulness, and sumquat childgered: 
His lif liked hym lyȝt, he louied þe lasse
Auþer to longe lye or to longe sitte, 
So bisied him his ȝonge blod and his brayn wylde. (86 - 89) 
Gerald Morgan consistently—almost apologetically—favours a positive reading of 
Arthur’s  character,  and  is  at  pains  to  show  that  there  is  nothing  imprudent  or 
improper about Arthur’s character or conduct. He argues that because the court is 
described with such ideal praise, it should be thought of as the noble embodiment of 
courtly virtue.  47
Morgan’s argument does not, however, take into consideration the fact that the 
Green  Knight  himself  questions  the  authenticity  of  the  court’s  reputation.  The 
skepticism of the Green Knight does not dissuade Morgan from arguing that there 
was no censure intended by the poet when he described Arthur as childgered: 
The word is carefully qualified by the poet – sumquat 
childgered – so as to ensure that the king’s conduct 
cannot  be  taken  to  exceed  the  bounds  proper  to 
adolescence.  The  phrase  suggests  boyish  energy 
rather  than  merriment.  The  pejorative  force  of 
modern English ‘childish’ is  certainly ruled out by 
the context.48
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Morgan argues that the emphasis on Arthur’s youthful restlessness was not intended 
as  a  point  of  criticism.  He  suggests  further  that  it  was  rather  meant  to  be  a 
“celebration of the period of adolescence in the king”.  In arguing for such reading of 49
the king as carefree and merry, he proposes that the poet’s intention is to remind the 
readers  that  the  story  is  set  in  the  first  age  of  Arthur’s  reign,  before  Guinevere’s 
infidelity causes a rift in the court. Jonathan Nicholls continues Morgan’s argument, 
stating that the king’s mirth was fitting to his state: 
 Any note of disapprobation that may be imagined in 
the phrase ‘rechles merþes’ should be dissipated by 
the  same  line  when  the  poet  talks  of  ‘rych  reuel 
oryȝt’, a qualifying statement that seems to approve 
of  the  fun  and  games  as  being  appropriate  to  a 
celebration of Christmas. 50
In the same way he disagrees with the negative interpretations of the phrase ‘sumquat 
childgered’, viewing it instead as a fitting quality for a young king. Burrow takes a 
different  line  of  argument  to  that  of  Morgan  and  Nicholls.  He  concedes  that  in 
principal there is nothing wrong with a young king being merry at a Christmas feast,  51
but he nonetheless affirms that the prefacing of childgered with the phrase sumquat, 
suggests that Arthur’s Yuletide revelries were bordering on excess.  Burrow offers a 52
significantly different interpretation of the line “With rych reuel oryȝt  and rechles 
merþes.” (40) While Nichols sees in the phrase ‘rych reuel oryȝ’, a note of approbation, 
Burrow interprets it as condemnatory. Tolkien and Gordon gloss ‘rechles’ as ‘care-
free’ or ‘joyous’, Burrow, however, notes that the word can also be taken to mean 
‘reckless’,  ‘heedless’ or ‘rash’.  Burrow interprets the terms ‘sumquat childgered’ 53
and ‘rechles’ to suggest that Arthur’s youthfulness was not fitting to his age or rank. 
The fittingness of Arthur’s youthful behaviour cannot be appropriately judged without 
some knowledge of his actual age. If he were a still a young boy, there would be 
nothing to criticize in his boyish behaviour, and the court is described as being in its 
first age, so Arthur could not have been very old. In a story that does not focus on 
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realism,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  the  significance  of  the  relative  ages  of  the 
characters with Arthur perhaps still in his boyhood, and Gawain his nephew already 
old enough to be a knight. 
If such terms are meant to convey age, it is then reasonable for us to infer that 
Arthur would have been a young man in the time that the poem is set. If then Arthur 
was a young man and not a boy, it seems unlikely that the reader is intended to view 
his  boyish  behaviour  with  approval.  Arthur  does  not  seem to  have  matured  into 
adulthood, and he seems to still retain the impatient energy of boyhood. His inability 
to  remain  still,  while  understandable  in  a  young  boy,  is  probably  to  be  read  as 
unfitting for one of his age. He further demonstrates his immaturity when he rashly 
responds to the provoking taunts of the Green Knight. Aquinas speaks of the need to 
perfect one’s character with a coming with age. He comments that the truth of human 
nature will be only fully realized in adolescence, for in childhood the humors have not 
yet reached their ultimate disposition.  Arthur seems to have failed so far to have 54
made this progression into an adolescent character. His behaviour suggests that he is 
still governed by the humours of a child. Modern critical disagreements point to an 
ambivalence that is probably ingrained in the text and its vocabulary, and that the 
problematic question of the propriety of Arthur’s conduct—and that of his court—
invites  the  reader  into  reflection  on  the  question  of  correct  conduct  as  the  poem 
progresses. The poem is about games within games, and riddles within deceptions. 
These draw the reader in, but also draw Gawain out,  taking him from the playful 
culture of Camelot into the earnestness (or so it seems) of the wild places of nature. 
What happens to him, and his experience of his ordeal, returns him to court with a 
more  serious  demeanor,  that  contrasts  with  the  mirth  at  Camelot  that  greets  the 
conclusion of the Green Knight’s game.  It is a journey on which he is accompanied 55
by the reader, but not by his fellow knights.
1.3 The Green Knight’s challenge
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III,81,1. co 54
All subsequent footnotes from the Summa Theologica will be in the following format: 
The initial Roman numeral denotes the part of the Summa (‘I’ indicates the first part, ‘I-II’ indicates the 
first part of the second part, II-II indicates the second part of the second part II, ‘III’ indicates the third 
part.) The second number in the citation denotes the question being referred to, and the third number 
refers to the article in reference, the final number/letter indicates which part of the article is being cited 
(s.c – “on the contrary”, co. - “I answer that”, ad - replies to objections). The following citation:  ‘III,
81, co’ does then refer to: third book, question 81, article 1, “I answer that”. 
 Manning, A Psychological Interpretation, 165. 55
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The  question  of  un-fittingness  and  impropriety  in  conduct  are  further 
precipitated  and  demonstrated  in  and  by  the  context  of  the  Green  Knight’s 
discourteous entrance into the court.  Without an introduction he abruptly demands 56
to know which of the men is Arthur, and then proceeds to reject Arthur’s hospitality, 
stating that he comes only to test the court’s reputation. He bluntly insults the knights 
by declaring that none would be a match against him in combat:
Nay, frayst I no fyt, in feyth I þe telle,
Hit arn aboute on þis bench bot berdlez chylder.
If I were hasped in armes on a heȝe stede, 
Here is no mon me to mach, for myȝtez so wayke. (279 – 282)
After insulting the court, the Green Knight lays down the rules of his Christmas game, 
and when none rise to the challenge, he insults them further:
Where is now your sourquydrye and your conquests,
Your gryndellayk and your greme, an dyour grete words? (311 – 312)
It is at this point, while the Green Knight laughs at the court, that Arthur himself is 
provoked into breeching the rules  of  courtesy:  “Þe blod schot  for  scham into his 
schyre face and lere; he wex wroth as wynde …”(317); rashly, the king accepts the 
challenge. Despite this description of his conduct, Gerald Morgan does not accept that 
Arthur has acted discourteously in his heated response. He argues that courtesy is the 
appropriate and fitting response to circumstances,  and in this moment, when Arthur 57
and his court had been publicly insulted, Morgan states that he was justified in his 
anger:
The  subsequent  anger  that  Arthur  shows  is  not  to  be 
interpreted  as  a  falling-off  in  courtesy.  The  virtue  of 
courtesy is essentially one of fitness. And this meaning of 
courtesy is to be taken strictly; courtesy is matter of fit 
words and not fair words. 58
 Robert W. Margeson, “Structure and Meaning in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight,” PLL, 13 (1977): 56
17.
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He compares Arthur’s response to the righteous anger of Christ in the Temple.  He 59
also  refers  to  Aquinas’  statement  “to  be  angry  in  accord  with  right  reason  is 
praiseworthy.”  Morgan’s reading, however, strains credulity in the light of the poet’s 60
own comments, and reminds us of the value of Foucault’s critique of the “cult of the 
author,” or at least of the “poet,” to be found in some types of criticism. Arthur’s 
anger is neither praised nor praiseworthy, for it is not in accord with right reason. 
Aquinas qualifies his definition of ‘right reason’, stating that anger is evil when “it 
withdraws reason from its  rectitude.”  That  is  to  say,  anger  is  only praiseworthy 61
when  it  is  used  as  a  corrective  to  another’s  fault.  Christ’s  anger  against  the 
moneylenders was an instance of correction, the anger of Arthur against the Green 
Knight was not, however, a corrective. He is merely responding the provocations of 
the Green Knight, who wishes to incite him into a rash act. Prudence dictates that 
Arthur ought not to have accepted the challenge. Wilfully endangering his life, for the 
sake of an insult against his court’s reputation is not an act of righteous anger. Gawain 
subtly suggests the impropriety of Arthur’s actions when he says:
For me þink hit not semly, as hit is soþ knawen,
þer such an asking s heuened so hyȝe in your sale, 
þaȝ ȝe ȝourself be talenttyf, to take hit to yourseluen… (348 - 350)
Arthur’s acceptance of the Christmas game was an act of recklessness, which Aquinas 
defines as a grave sin. “Fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due love, or on 
account of pride,  or  by reason of folly.”  Recklessness is  equally opposed to the 62
virtue of fortitude as the vice of timidity. Aquinas states: “Fearlessness by its specific 
nature corrupts the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly.”  63
Arthur’s acceptance of the Green Knight’s challenge is, by Aquinas’ definition, an act 
of recklessness. For it was on account of both his pride and folly that he accepted the 
challenge.  In  general  terms,  Arthur’s  recklessness  serves  as  a  foil  to  Gawain’s 
 Ibid., 56. (The section he refers to can be found in John 2: 13-17 The Holy Bible, Revised Standard 59
Version, Second Catholic edition, Ignatius Press, San Francisco 2006.)
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prudence.  Arthur’s  own meeting with the Green Knight  leads into action that  is 64
firmly rooted in injured pride—an affliction that  may well overtake Gawain in his 
encounter in the Green Chapel (2369 – 2388).
1.4 Gawain’s speech
Gawain’s acceptance of the rules and terms of the Christmas game has the 
qualities of an authentic act of fortitude that can be seen with a close analysis of his 
speech. The different states that Arthur and Gawain are in when they accepted the 
challenge  are  important.  The  poet  makes  it  clear  that  when  Arthur  accepts  the 
challenge it is an act of impulsive rage, “Þe blod schot for scham into his schyre face 
and lere; he wex as wroth as wynde”(219). Aquinas condemns such rashness as sinful: 
“To act quickly before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be 
to  act  rashly,  which  is  a  vice  contrary  to  prudence”.  It  is  often  necessary  and 65
virtuous  to  act  swiftly  and  without  taking  counsel  from  others,  but  the  counsel 
Aquinas  speaks of  here  is  the  counsel  of  one’s  own prudence,  for  to  act  without 
prudence is always to act wrongly. Gawain, on the other hand, is in a more composed 
state when he intervenes,  and this  may be noted by the decorum he shows when 
asking permission to rise from table: 
Wolde ȝe, worþilych lorde,’ qouþ Wawan to þe kyng, 
‘Bid me boȝe fro þis benche, and stonde by yow þere,
þat I wythoute vylanye myt voyde þis table,
And þat my legge lady liked not ille. (343 - 346)
After asking permission to rise, Gawain suggests, with subtle tact, that Arthur had 
acted amiss. He offers him his ‘counsyl’ and says that it was not ‘semly’ for him to 
accept the challenge. It would be discourteous to accuse Arthur of acting rashly, yet 
somehow Gawain  must  dissuade  him  from recklessly  jeopardizing  his  life.   The 
reason he gives is an ostensible one: 
For me þink hit not semly, as hit is soþ knawen,
þer such an asking is heuened so hyȝe in your sale,
þat ȝe ȝourself be talenttyf, to take hit to yourseluen,
 John Leyerle, “The Game and Play of Hero” in Concepts of the Hero in the Middle Ages and the 64
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Whil monu so bolde yow aboute vpon bench sytten (348 - 351)
The  Christmas  game  is,  as  both  characters  and  readers  discover  later,  one  great 
deception.  It  is  then  significant,  and  ironically  appropriate,  that  Gawain’s  first 
argument to dissuade Arthur is an appeal to truth: “as hit is soþ knawen” (348). Gawain 
argues that the unseemliness of Arthur accepting the challenge self-evident, it  is a 
known truth. Arthur’s valour is already proven; accordingly the other knights have a 
stronger claim to the challenge. Gawain argues that the king should allow him this 
opportunity to prove himself. But even in this argument, where Gawain appeals to a 
supposedly self-evident truth, there is a lack of truthfulness. 
Gawain’s reasons given for dissuading Arthur seem disingenuous. Gawain’s 
courteous manner suggest more than his words, inviting the reader to reflect that the 
king’s acceptance of the challenge of a rash and foolhardy game would be unseemly, 
rather than simply offering an opportunity for the other knights to prove themselves.  66
The text does not suggest that Arthur himself thought it a noble challenge, indeed 
when the challenge is first made he remains silent—this is not the kind of game he 
was looking for. It is only when Arthur is further provoked by the taunts of the Green 
Knight that he succumbs, and when he does so he is motivated by wrath and not 
reason.  The  subtlety  of  Gawain’s  speech  suggests  a  sensitivity  to  this  fault,  but 
courtesy must prevent him from openly condemning Arthur’s actions. He must put 
forward an ostensible reason for Arthur not accepting the challenge, so he suggests 
that the challenge is an apt opportunity for a knight to further his renown, and by this 
reasoning he asserts that of all the court, he is most entitled to the challenge: 
Bot for as much as ȝe ar myn em I am only to prayse,
No bounte bot your blod I n my bode knowe;
And syþen þis note is so sys þat noȝt hit yow falles,
And I haue frayned hit at yow first, foldez hit to me (356 – 359)
The poet does not present Gawain with a low sense of his own self-worth, with only 
his kinship with Arthur to boast of, and across the poem he remains the knight who is 
the  archetype  of  chivalric  excellence  and  courtesy.  More  plausible  is  the 67
understanding that his self-deprecating words are a strategy for taking the challenge 
 H.E. Morgan, “An analysis of the methods and presumed functions of characterization in the three 66
medieval romances of Yvain and Gawain, Morte de Arthur, and Sir Gawain and the Green Knight” (B. 
Litt. Thesis, Oxford, 1969), 7.
 Barlett J. Whiting, Gawain: His Reputation, His courtesy, and His Appearance in Chaucer’s Squire’s 67
Tale (New York: St Edmundsberry Press, 1947), 189.
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off the king, for whom it is entirely inappropriate. Gawain cannot vaunt this chivalric 
superiority as an argument entitling him to the challenge, for such hubris would be 
contrary to rules of  courtesy,  and so instead he humbles himself  to advance his 68
claim,  though  this  self-deprecation  should  not  be  thought  to  reflect  his  true  self-
understanding  (354  –  355).  Gawain’s  shield,  with  the  perfections  it  symbolizes, 
reflects more accurately the high opinion he has of himself, just ashis position of rank 
sitting by the side of the queen, reveals that he is highly esteemed at court.  It is 69
evident that he accepts the Green Knight’s challenge not to further his own renown, 
but rather to protect Arthur from danger. It is because of this distinction between their 
motives that Gawain’s acceptance of the Green Knight’s challenge can be read as 
virtuous,  while  Arthur’s  cannot.  Gawain shows both prudence and fortitude while 
Arthur showed anger and rashness. 
It should not be thought that Gawain’s actions were courageous while Arthur’s 
were not, simply because Arthur acts with less calculation than Gawain. It is their 
different motivations that so distinguished their acts. Arthur endangers his life for the 
sake of his court’s reputation, while Gawain’s motive is the preservation of Arthur’s 
life. Only the later motive qualifies as a brave act in medieval moral thought. Aquinas 
comments: “It is for the sake of the good that the brave man exposes himself to the 
danger of death.”  That is to say, life is a good in itself, and an act of fortitude is only 70
authentic when you risk that good for a higher good. The reputation of Camelot is a 
good,  but  it  is  not  a  good  higher  than  life;  the  preservation  of  another’s  life  is, 
however,
 worth dying for.  At the heart of the distinction is the reasonableness of the good 
itself: “In overcoming danger, fortitude seeks not danger itself, but the realization of a 
rational good.”  It is absence of any ‘rational good’ is the clause that makes Arthur 71
vain and justifies Gawain. Aquinas adds: “To take death upon oneself is not in itself 
praiseworthy, but solely because of its subordination to good.”  Gawain’s readiness 72
to die is virtuous only because it is for the sake of another life, the same cannot be 
said of Arthur’s impulsiveness and injured pride. 
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1.5 The Gawain tradition
The  poet’s  choice  to  give  Gawain  the  answer  to  the  Green  Knight’s  Christmas 
challenge is  not  accidental,  and is  informed by and contributes  to  a  deep literary 
tradition around his character. This literary deliberation is made apparent by the Green 
Knight’s meaningful remark to Gawain when he steps forward: 
‘Sir Gawan, so mot i þryue
as i am ferly fayn
þis dint þat þou shal dryue.(387 – 389)
His is  ‘ferly fauyn’ or ‘exceeding glad’ not  because his  Christmas game has been 
accepted, but rather because it was Gawain in particular who volunteered. The Green 
Knight further emphasizes these sentiments with an oath:
 ‘bigog,’ quoþ þe grene knyȝt, ‘Sir Gawan, me lykes
þat i schal fange at þy fust þat i haf frayst here. (390 – 391)
This unexplained preference invites the reader to consider why it  is  so significant 
Gawain should now take up the challenge.  Already at this stage of the story there are 
hints the challenge is more than a mere ‘Crystemas gomen’(283). The Green Knight’s 
intention  to  test  the  reputation  of  Arthur’s  court  is  already  suggested  when  he 
tauntingly remarks that such a group of beardless young men were not worthy of their 
high reputation. If,  then, his game is a test of the chivalric excellence of Arthur’s 
court, the question must be asked why he is so glad that Gawain in particular should 
be the court’s representative. The answer to this question is informed by the reader’s 
familiarity with the diverse literary tradition around Gawain’s character. 
Twelfth-century Arthurian literature initiated a tradition of Gawain as a master 
of courtesy and decorum, though the later stories often depict him as a philanderer, 
and others even as lecherous.   It is far easier to define characters such as Tristan or 73
Troilus, for though their stories have been retold many times, it is the same story that 
is retold, each rendition of the story has slight alterations in their behaviour, but their 
general character is constrained by the plot and their actions within it. The character 
of Gawain is not, however, limited in this way, stories of his deeds and misdeeds are 
disseminated  over  a  wide  range  of  literature;  there  is  no  one  Gawain  story,  and 
 Authors such as Chrétien de Troyes and Marie de France describe a virtuous Gawain, while later 73
accounts such as Chaucer’s The Wife of Bath’s tale show a less estimable portrayal of Gawain. 
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therefore no fixed Gawain. Anecdotes that point to defining attributes of his received 
character must be gathered from the various romances he features in, but this does not 
leave the reader with a fully coherent character.  
Jessie  Weston  invites  some  optimism  about  the  possibility  of  forming  a 
coherent understanding of Sir Gawain’s dynamic character. She says:
It ought not to be impossible to single out from among 
the  various  versions  of  Gawain’s  adventures  certain 
features  which,  by  their  frequent  recurrence  in  the 
romances devoted to him, and their analogy to ancient 
Celtic tradition, seem as if they might with probability 
be regarded as forming part of his original story. It is 
scarcely  to  be  hoped  that  we  can  ever  construct  a 
coherent account on which we may lay our finger and 
say ‘This, and no other, was the original Gawain story’; 
but  we  may,  I  think,  be  able  to  specify  certain 
incidents, saying, ‘This belongs to Gawain and to no 
other of king Arthur’s knights.’74
Typically  Gawain  is  portrayed  as  the  knight  of  perfect  courtesy,  tactfulness  and 
prudence.  In  the story of  Eric  and Enide,  Chrétien     de  Troyes describes  him as 
Arthur’s chief advisor. He warns him against hunting the white stag, and when Arthur 
does not listen, and his knights begin to quarrel, he turns to Gawain saying “my good 
nephew, advise me how to keep my honour and my rights, for I have no wish for 
quarrelling.”  The confidence he puts in Gawain’s discretion reflects the prudence 75
and good judgment of the knight. Chrétien     frequently describes him in terms of 
superlative praise. “For in the whole of [Arthur’s] court there was no better or more 
gallant  knight  [than]  Gawain  his  beloved  nephew,  whom no  one  could  match.”  76
Marie  de  France  portrays  Gawain  in  similarly  favourable  manner.  In  Lanval  she 
describes him as “Gawain the noble, the brave, who was loved by all.”  Indeed he is 77
the only knight who acts nobly in the story, the rest of Arthur’s court are shown in an 
unfavourable light  through their  mistreatment of  Lanval.  When Lanval’s  life  is  in 
danger, Gawain is the only knight concerned with helping him. Not all medieval poets 
depict Gawain in so favorable a light, but it is evident throughout that in the story of 
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SGGK  the  poet  is  drawing  on  and  developing  the  virtuous  tradition  of  Gawain’s 
character.  If  not,  it  is  hard  to  see  where  the  Green Knight’s  words  approval  of 78
Gawain accepting the challenge could come from. If a lesser knight, such as Sir Kay, 
failed to prove himself it would prove little, but if the best knight fell short, all of 
Arthur’s court would be dishonored. The Green Knight is certainly not taken in by 
Gawain’s  self-deprecating  words  to  Arthur,  he  seems  instead  to  be  informed  by 
background knowledge of Gawain’s high reputation, and so is glad of the opportunity 
to test it. In this way, he can be seen as a proxy for the poet, and the poet’s playful 
intrusion into the Gawain tradition. He stands beside the poet—knowing the full story 
and its tricks as they unfold—and in a real way the Green Knight is the author of the 
poem’s unfolding events.  Both test Gawain, and both, in the end, are far gentler 79
towards the character who is the butt of their games, than he is towards himself.
1.6 Blind promises
The two promises of Gawain are pivotal points of the poem, and all the tension of the 
narrative  is  centred  upon  his  adherence  to  their  terms.  The  blind  promises  that 80
Gawain makes to the Green Knight  and Bertilak constantly place him into trying 
situations  where  both  his  honour  and  chastity  are  probed  in  the  context  of  his 
truthfulness to his word and the code he believes that he lives by. The promises of 
Gawain  are  necessary  for  the  narrative  progression,  but  their  function  is  more 
significant than that of plot devices. Susanne Sara Thomas notes that “the Gawain-
poet  challenges  the  reader  to  question  the  nature  and  validity  of  all  oaths  and 
promises.”  The reader is  invited to deliberate over whether all  promises should 81
indeed be kept, as the poet rebukes a moral fundamentalism that treats all oaths as 
equal in value.  Susanne Thomas notes the distinct lack of attention given by critics 82
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towards the “essential treachery and legal insubstantiality of the oaths.”  In support 83
of  her  argument  she  cites  Aquinas:  “if  a  man  has  promised  something  evidently 
unlawful, because he sinned in promise, then he did well to change his mind.”  The 84
absurdity of the oath is already evident in the game: it is self-evidently unlawful to 
arbitrarily behead a person as Christmas fun. Susanne Thomas substantiates this claim 
by referring to the nature of  legal  agreements  in the fourteenth-century to further 
show the nature of Gawain’s promises rendered them not binding. She puts forward 
an argument showing that Gawain was under no legal or moral obligation to fulfil 
either of his promises. This view of the poem shows the effects of the changing legal 
systems of the Middle Ages, suggesting a nostalgia for a former age of England, when 
agreements where all  promises of truth,  rather than written up legal agreements.  85
Enlightening as this approach is, the narrative as a whole reflects more of an interest 
in morality than in legality. The poet has a vested interest in showing how different 
virtues  operate  under  particular  circumstances,  and  the  main  function  of  the 
agreements between Gawain and the Green Knight is to facilitate the creation of those 
circumstances 
Susanne Thomas’ observation, that the promises were perhaps not understood 
by contemporary readers as morally or legally binding, is certainly a significant point 
to be aware of, but it is without doubt equally significant that Gawain’s character, in 
his superlative world of Romance, believes the oaths to be binding. A legal and ethical 
examination  of  the  binding  nature  of  the  promises  is  not  unimportant.  In  the 
fourteenth-century perhaps an unwritten agreement with an anonymous man would 
not have been considered binding, but it  must not be forgotten that the story is a 
Romance narrative filled with magic; the question remains as to what extent the poet 
is balancing his serious themes with his fantastic setting. It is most important to note 
the fact that Gawain did believe himself bound to keep his promise, for in making this 
the central focus, the discussion is orientated towards evaluating his response to this 
‘obligation’. And it is within the framework of this perceived obligation that the poet 
comments upon human nature and in particular the role of the conscience.86
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Geoffrey Chaucer also used blind promises to facilitate scenarios wherein their 
characters must weigh up the importance of their word. Gawain’s contract with the 
Green Knight is similar in characterization and outcome to Dorigen’s oath to Aurelius 
in The Franklin’s Tale, in that neither expects that they will have to fulfil their end of 
the bargain, and neither would have had occasion to if the antagonists had not used 
magical deception.  The blind promises and intrusion of magic enable both poets to 87
create  scenarios  wherein  their  characters’ truth  is  weighed  against  another  good. 
Dorigen must forgo her fidelity to her husband, or break her truth. Similarly Gawain 
must seek out his own execution, or break his truth. The decision of both protagonists 
reflects  the  priority  of  truth  in  medieval  ethical  and  moral  thought.   Dorigen 88
considers ending her life to avoid fulfilling her end of the bargain, but like Gawain 
she does not consider breaking her trouthe to be an option:
"Allas," quod she, " on thee, Fortune, I pleyne,  
 That unwar wrapped hast me in thy cheyne,  
 Fro which t'escape woot I no socour,  
 Save oonly deeth or elles 
dishonour; Oon of thise two 
bihoveth me to chese.  
 But nathelees, yet have I levere to lese  
  My lif than of my body to 
have a shame,  Or knowe myselven fals, or 
lese my name.”  (1355- 1362)
When her husband returns, he reiterates the same viewpoint, advising her to keep her 
promise: “But if ye sholde youre trouthe kepe and save. Trouthe is the hysete thing 
that man may kepe.” (770 – 771) In a similar way the Gawain-poet suggests that 
Gawain should, above all keep his trouthe. He does this in an emphatic way when he 
addresses Gawain directly: 
Now þenk wel, sir gawan,
for woþe þat þou ne wonde 
þis auenture for to frayn
þat þou hatz tan on honed. (487 – 490)
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The poet breaks from his role as a distant narrator, and addresses Gawain directly.  89
This dramatic narrative technique highlights the tension of the internal conflict that 
also confronts Gawain. When the poet, who orchestrates the entire plot, momentarily 
extricates himself from this role, he then offers the reader a moment of suspended 
belief,  and  the  chance  to  think  of  Gawain  as  an  autonomous  individual.  In  this 
moment he warns Gawain against ‘wonde’ (488),  a word that Tolkien and Gordon 
define as ‘to shrink from or neglect something due to fear’.  The danger or ‘woþe’ 90
that might prompt him to neglect the keeping of his word is a very real fear of death. 
Gawain knows that he lacks the Green Knight’s miraculous ability to survive the blow 
of the axe, seeking out the Green Chapel is then effectually seeking out his own death. 
Nonetheless the poet exhorts him to keep his word, regardless of the cost. 
The Green Knight also reiterates the gravity of Gawain’s oath before departing 
from the court:
‘Loke, Gawan, þou be grayþe to fo as þou hettez,
And latye as lelly til þou me, lude, fynde, 
As þou hatz hette in þis halle, herande þise knyȝtes’ (448 - 450)
He allows Gawain no opportunity to dismiss the whole affair as a foolish Christmas 
game: ‘Þerfore com, oþer recreaunt be calde þe behoues’ (456). Arthur’s knights do 
not seem to share the same moral conviction that he should keep his word. Rather 
than commending him for his loyalty to his word, they lament the threatened loss of 
such a good knight: 
For to counseyl þe knyȝt, with care at her hert.
Þere watz much derue doel driuen in þe sale 
Þat so worthe as Wawan schulde wende on þat ernde,
To dryȝ a delful dynt, and dele no more
Wyth bronde.     (556 - 560)
The  poet  reasserts  the  moral  preeminence  of  Gawain  in  his  almost  nonchalant 
response:
þhe kniȝt mad ay god chere,
And sayde, ‘quot schuld I wonde?
Of destines derf and dere
What may mon do bot fonde?’ (562 - 565)
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His cheerfully phrased rhetorical questions suggest a distinct absence of fear on his 
part, as he seems to have risen to the detached level of a Stoic. 
The relationship between ideal words and conduct in the courtly context are 
challenged later in the poem, and collapse under the weight of human emotion. The 
events of fitts three and four will reveal his deep fear of death, and yet this natural fear 
does not detract from his character in the eyes of others in the poem, and certainly 
gives it real depth for the reader. His decision to seek out the Green Chapel would in 
fact  not be an act of true courage if  he had no fear of death.  It  is  necessary that 
Gawain retain the natural fear of death, for the poet exemplifies in him an authentic 
figure of courage.  Josef Pieper speaks of this necessity of fear in any act of courage, 
building upon the Thomistic understanding of virtue:
“Fortitude presupposes in a certain sense that man is 
afraid of evil; its essence lies not in knowing no fear, 
but in not allowing oneself to be forced into evil by 
fear,  or  to  be  kept  by  fear  from  the  realization  of 
good.”91
Gawain fulfils these conditions when he goes in search of the Green Chapel.  His 
natural  fear  of  death  prompts  him to  break  his  truth,  and  yet  he  overcomes  this 
impulse in an act of authentic fortitude. The framework of blind promise enables the 
poet to create a scenario wherein Gawain must weigh up his life beside his truth. 
Other Arthurian romances recount tales of knights setting off on perilous quests, but 
they have a hope of surviving and winning glory,  while Gawain seems to have no 92
reason to hope for either. Readers of the poem, along with Gawain, are put in the 
situation where they must ask if one ought always do the honourable thing, regardless 
of the implications.  There is no material motivation for Gawain to keep his promise 
other than his simple adherence to righteousness and justice. By the discouragement 
of his fellow knights, and the seeming certitude of death, the Gawain-poet shows the 
dignity in acting for virtue’s own sake. The poet gives little reason for the reader to 
suppose that Gawain sought out the chapel for any other reason. Gawain’s search for 
the Green Chapel does then become emblematic of the man who seeks justice for its 
own sake.  93
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Gawain’s search for justice for its own sake evokes a pervasive concern of 
Western literature, and parallels that of the man described in The Republic, who seeks 
justice though it costs him his life.  Plato is unlikely to be a direct source, but his 
exposition of moral philosophy lies at the foundation of Western tradition, and his 
ideas were mediated through the works of philosophers like Aquinas. Plato says that 
when  justice  is  praised,  it  is  often  only  the  appearance  of  justice  that  is  being 
considered. For, in discussing the desirability of justice, one often only hears of its 
effects. He says “No one has ever censured injustice or commended justice otherwise 
than in respect of the repute, the honors, and the gifts that accrue from each.”  He 94
goes on to note that none have yet written on the true essence of justice, explaining 
why it is a good that one should strive after, even if no good seems to come from it. 
Plato argues why justice is a good in and of itself, irrespective of the effects that may, 
or may not, come from the practice of it: 
…but  what  each  one  of  them  [justice  and 
injustice] is in itself, by its own inherent force, 
when it is within the soul of the possessor and 
escapes the eyes of both gods and men, no one 
has ever adequately set forth in poetry or prose
—the proof  that  the  one is  the  greatest  of  all 
evils that the soul contains within itself, while 
justice is the greatest good.95
 This is the very task that the Gawain-poet sets out to fulfil: to show that justice is 
worthwhile for its own sake. Like Plato the purifies his argument and character by 
removing any discussion of gain.  Plato says that the person who is whipped, put on 
the rack, branded with hot irons and crucified for justice’s sake is still better off than 
the unjust man who enjoys every kind of comfort.  The Gawain-Poet suggests that it 96
is better for Gawain to leave the comfort of court life and seek out Green Chapel, not 
because he will merit anything by it, but because of justice. 
          Plato comments that when discussing justice, you must speak of a just man who 
does not have the reputation of justice. “Unless you take away the true repute and 
attach  the  false,  we  shall  say  that  it  is  not  justice  that  you  are  praising  but  the 
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semblance.”  Plato holds that it is only when we speak of a just man, who is not 97
thought be so, that the intrinsic worth of justice can be explored with clarity. He notes:
We must, indeed, not allow him to seem good, for 
if he does he will have all the rewards and honors 
paid to the man who has a reputation for justice, 
and  we  shall  not  be  able  to  tell  whether  his 
motive is love of justice of love or the rewards 
and honors.98
 
Gawain does not suffer the scorn and derision of the just man in Plato’s example. It is 
enough, however, that the knights were disapproving of his quest. Their lack of praise 
reveals that it is not out of vainglory that Gawain seeks out the Green Chapel.  If the 99
other knights had suggested that he was bound to keep his word, it might reasonably 
be inferred that his departure was prompted by the desire to maintain his reputation. 
The poet however makes it clear that he would suffer no censure if he remained. He is 
in fact criticized by his fellow knights for departing. “Bi Kryst, hit is scaþe þat þou, 
leude, schal be lost, þat art of lyf noble!” (674) This point is stressed again at the end 
of the poem when Gawain is nearly at the Green Chapel and Bertilak’s messenger 
tells him that if he turns back, none will know of it. Throughout the story readers are 
reminded that Gawain kept his truth for its own sake, and not to avoid the censure or 
calumnies of Arthur’s court.
 1.7 The pentangle shield 
The themes of justice and truth are explored throughout the poem, but they are not the 
only virtues that the poet makes a study of, for no virtue can stand alone, but must be 
balanced out and complemented by others. The poet extrapolates on this interwoven 
nature of virtues through his image of the pentangle upon Gawain’s shield.  The 100
poet’s description of Gawain’s shield and its placement in the narrative are greatly 
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significant for the poem’s wider interest in the problem of virtue. The poet emphasizes 
the importance of the shield, telling the reader he will explain its symbolism, though it 
should delay his story. “I am intent yow to telle, þof tar hyt me schulde” (624). The 
emblem upon Gawain’s shield denotes the five virtues that he excelled most in, and 
the  poet  comments  that  he  possessed  them more  perfectly  than  any  other  (655). 
Gawain  shows  his  fraunchyse  and  felaȝschyp  when  he  dissuades  Arthur  from 
accepting the Green Knight’s challenge, and volunteers himself. His magnanimity and 
love for  his  fellow man are  shown through these  deeds,  furthermore his  clannes, 
cortayse and pité are tested in his encounters with Lady Bertilak. Her three visitations 
are trials of his purity courtesy and piety. It is significant that the poet describes him 
as perfect in these five virtues, for it is a moment of self-realization when Gawain 
discovers  that  courtesy  and  purity  cannot  always  be  practiced  in  perfect 
accordance.  Lady Bertilak  attempts  to  force  Gawain  into  compromising one  of 101
these ideals, and prudently he gives precedence to clannes (1770). His encounters with 
Lady Bertilak and the Green Knight lead Gawain into an increasing awareness of the 
complexity of the chivalric code. He discovers that the tenets of chivalry, in certain 
situations, are in tension with one another. Courtesy cannot always be practiced in 
perfect  accord with  chastity,  and gentility  cannot  be  maintained when violence is 
required. Derek Pearsall notes the poet’s implicit commentary on the tension inherent 
in chivalric system:
The  contrivance  of  the  story  allows  the 
contradictions  within  the  system  to  emerge, 
reveals the fragility of the weave, the manner in 
which a multiplicity of different impulses and 
ideals, appetites and codes of restraint, are held 
in precarious orbit.102
The ‘precarious orbit’ of the virtues is a central theme explored in the poem. One 
virtue is always interconnected with another and none stands in isolation. The poet 
makes this truth apparent in the unending knot of the pentangle: 
And vchone halched in oþer, þat non ende hade, 
And fyched vpon fyue poyntez, þat fayled neuer,
Withouten ende at any noke I ooquere fynde,
Whereeuer þe gomen bygan, or golden to an ende. (657 - 660)
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The image of the pentangle reflects the interconnectedness of each virtue, showing 
how one cannot stand without the other. Just as the pentangle retains its shape only 
when all its lines are connected, so too a man only remains truly virtuous when all the 
principal  virtues  are  harmoniously  present  and  connected.  Aquinas  similarly 
distinguishes and unites the cardinal virtues, showing how each has its own definition, 
yet each still is contingent upon the others:
Discretion  belongs  to  prudence,  rectitude  to 
justice, moderation to temperance, and strength 
of mind to fortitude…. In this way the reason 
for connection is evident: for strength of mind 
is not commended as virtuous, if it be without 
moderation  or  rectitude  of  discretion:  and  so 
forth…103
How and to what degree each virtue should be practiced is largely dependent upon the 
circumstances, and it is in both the success and failure of Gawain that this point is 
illustrated.  When he gives precedence to purity over courtesy he shows discretion, 104
ordering the higher good above the lower. But when he accepts the girdle he lacks 
rectitude, judging his life of higher importance than his trouthe. Through this success 
and  failure  the  poet  interrogates  the  pre-eminence  of  prudence  as  the  foundation 
underpinning all other virtues.  105
Prudence can be seen to guide all  Gawain’s  virtuous acts  to  some degree. 
When he seeks out the Green Chapel it is prudence that orientates him towards the 
good of keeping his trouthe and when he refuses the lady it is prudence that prompts 
his steadfast attachment to clannes. It is again prudence that allows Gawain to make 
the right choice, esteeming one good above another, purity over courtesy, and it is 
ultimately his lack of perfect prudence that causes him to break his trouthe in loving 
his  own  life  too  dearly.  The  poet  explores  the  pre-eminence  of  prudence  as  the 
foundation of every virtuous act. Aquinas affirms this moral truth: ‘no moral virtue 
can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice.’  106
Aquinas demonstrates that it is prudence that unites all virtues and moderates them to 
their mean, for each virtue is united by prudence, and when an act is no longer guided 
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by prudence it ceases to be virtuous.  Just as the pentangle ceases to be a star when 107
one line is broken.   David Beauregard notes this Thomistic influence on the poet’s 
thought:
If  the  pentangle  is  understood  to  represent  the 
perfection  of  the  connected  virtues,  the  question 
then becomes a matter of which virtues are dealt 
with  in  the  poem.  I  suggest  that  fortitude  or 
courage in its Thomistic dimensions is represented 
in its various aspects of fear and daring, aggression 
and endurance, moderation and restraint.  108
Beauregard also argues that  the pentangle as a whole should be understood as an 
emblem of truthfulness. The entire poem centres on Gawain’s pursuit of trouthe, and 
it is no accident that his shield should reflects this focus.  Solomon’s pentangle was 109
an  emblem  of  his  truthfulness:  “Hit  is  a  syngne  þat  Salamon  set  sumquyle  in 
bytoknyng of trawþe” (626). Gawain’s truthfulness is not, however, perfect, as the end 
of the narrative makes clear. Gawain, a fallen man, fails to live up the excellence 
symbolized  in  his  shield.  It  should  not,  however,  be  thought  that  the  imperfect 
truthfulness of Gawain reflects an untruthfulness of the poet, in describing his hero as 
other  than he was.  For when he describes the symbolism of the shield,  he is  not 
describing Gawain as he is, but rather how he was thought of by others and himself. 
The shield speaks more of Gawain’s reputation than it does of his actual character. 
The  poet  says  that  “Gawan  watz  for  gode  knawen.”  (633)  The  use  of  the  word 
‘knawen’ implies that one should understand the shield to reflect what he was known 
for, rather than any “reality”.  110
In an age when characters’ interiority was seldom explored by authors, the 
shield presents us with Gawain’s idealised version of himself. In a period so steeped 
in  the  use  of  symbolism it  is  natural  that  the  Gawain-poet  used  the  emblem on 
Gawain’s shield to reflect the knight’s own self-understanding. C.S. Lewis discusses 
this rich symbolism of medieval thought in his work The Discarded Image.  He 111
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explains  the  meaning  of  the  pentangle  that  the  reader  may  comprehend  not  how 
Gawain was,  but  how he thought  himself  to be.  A.C.  Spearing comments on this 
subjective mode of symbolism: 
It is not only that an elaborated code makes it 
relatively easy for the user to express his inner 
states and purposes; it also encourages him to 
be aware of his own subjectivity, to conceive 
of  and  reflect  on  his  personal  identity,  his 
selfhood. 112
Gawain’s  belief  in  his  own perfection  proves  false,  though he  was  not  deceiving 
himself intentionally. The character gets caught up in his own fictional reputation in a 
playful irony on the poet’s part. To a large extent, he lives up to the ideals in his 
shield, he showed himself to be chaste, courteous and pious throughout the story, and, 
with  the  exception  of  the  green  girdle,  he  kept  his  truth  also.  It  is  furthermore 
significant that Gawain was himself aware of his good reputation, and, what is more, 
believed it to be true. It is possible for a man to have a high reputation without being 
fully aware of it, or if it was made known to him, it is possible for him to disbelieve it 
authenticity. But it is certain that Gawain both knew his reputation and believed it to 
be true, and this is made apparent by his willingness to wear his shield.  113
Gawain’s  chief  imperfection  is  the  perfect  confidence  he  has  of  his  own 
perfection. He lacks an awareness of his own weakness, and his sense of his moral 
superiority leaves him susceptible to deception.  If he had been self-aware he would 114
have perceived his fear of death, and perhaps noted the inclination to act deceptively 
because of it. Gawain’s belief in his own perfection is an act of self-deception.  He 115
is  deceived  by  the  Lady  and  the  Green  Knight,  but  the  greatest  deception  is  by 
himself.  When he enters into the Christmas game he does not know of the Green 
Knight’s  ability  to  survive  the  blow of  the  axe,  when  he  agrees  to  the  game  of 
exchanges with Bertilak he is  ignorant of the premeditated test  that  will  be made 
against  his  chastity  by  the  lady,  and  when he  is  tempted,  he  is  unaware  that  his 
response to the lady will dictate how he we be judged by the Green Knight. When 
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these many levels of deception are revealed to him he is stunned into momentary 
silence. He “stod a gret whyle, so agreued for greme he gryed withine; alle þe blode 
of his brest blende in his face.” (2369) He is angered at being so deceived by them 
both,  and he is  angered still  further and ashamed on seeing how he has deceived 
himself. “Þat al he schank for schome þat þe shalk talked” (2372). The events of the 
story all  forward the poet’s  intention of  bringing Gawain to this  moment  of  self-
discovery.  The poet’s laconic summary of Gawain’s trials in the wild, and lengthier 116
description of his encounters with the lady, further show that the poet is interested in 
focusing on those events that lead Gawain closer towards a clearer self-knowledge.  117
He does not delay his narrative with elaborate descriptions of Gawain battling against 
the dragons, wolves, trolls, bulls, bears, boars and ogres. Unlike the Beowulf-Poet, he 
is not interested in showing the prowess of his hero.  He says it would be tedious to 118
speak of such events. “So mony meruayl bi mount þer þe mon fyndez, hit were to tore 
for to telle of þe tenþe dole.” (718) The poet’s interest is in those conflicts that will 
test Gawain’s virtue more than those that will test his strength.119
1.8 Boethius and the Gawain-Poet
The  conclusion  of  SGGK  reveals  a  deep  interest  in  the  attitude  the  hero  adopts 
towards death.  Gawain’s fault partly lies in his attitude towards death. The problem 120
of death is universal, but in addition to Christian reflections on death, the medieval 
mind was offered a series of reflections on death by the widely popular work of the 
sixth-century  writer  Boethius.   His  Consolation  of  Philosophy  is  devoted  to 121
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exploring  the  proper  attitude  one  should  have  towards  death.  The  work  was 122
translated into Middle English during the lifetime of the Gawain-poet by Geoffrey 
Chaucer.  Lady Bertilak’s visitations, like those of Lady Philosophy in Boethius’ 123
work, ironically prove to be instructive. They allow Gawain to realize how his fear of 
death  misguided  his  judgement.  Lady  Philosophy  teaches  Boethius,  by  means  of 
careful  arguments  that  his  present  unhappiness  stems from an  inordinate  view of 
death and excessive attachment to temporal goods . While Lady Bertilak convinces 124
Gawain to accept and Green girdle, and in doing so allows him to discover that he 
loved his own life too dearly. He realizes the imbalance of his value system when he 
shamefully recognises that he compromised his virtuous ideal out of fear for death. 
The  lady’s  trial  of  Gawain’s  virtue  indirectly  guides  him  to  a  moment  of  self-
realization that alters his worldview, and in a similar manner Lady Philosophy guides 
Boethius  towards  the  same goal.  She explains  that  his  happiness  is  completely 125
determined  by  his  perception  of  circumstances.  Though  imprisoned  with  a  death 
sentence, she tells him he still has occasion to be glad. So long as he is alive, he has 
things  for  which  he  may  find  occasion  to  be  thankful  for.  She  even  scorns  his 
discontentment at being imprisoned, arguing that incarceration is only a cause of grief 
because he thinks it so:
 
Nothing is miserable unless you think it so; and on 
the other hand, nothing brings happiness unless you 
are content with it. No one is so completely happy 
that he would not choose to change his condition if 
he let himself think about it impatiently… Why then 
do men look outside themselves for happiness which 
is within?126
 
Though he is confronted with the prospect of his own death at the end of the 
first fitt, Gawain succeeds in remaining recollected, even happy for most of the poem. 
He has the appearance of mirth at  both Arthur’s court  and Bertilak’s.  Despite the 
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knowledge of his impending death, Gawain exhibits a high degree of self-mastery, in 
not allowing this knowledge to destroy his happiness. He jokes affably with Bertilak, 
agrees to his game of exchanges, and acts most agreeably and courteously towards his 
wife. It would seem that Gawain was a good practitioner of Boethius’s philosophy 
towards death; for he stolidly refuses that his fate should affect his happiness. The end 
of the poem does, however, reveal that he was deeply affected by the prospect of his 
death.  Though his outward actions betrayed little  anxiety,  his  acceptance of the 127
green girdle reflect his interior state. He willingness to accept the girdle, in order to 
avoid death shows that he loved life too dearly.  This fault is what Gawain discovers 
in  his  moment  of  self-realization  in  the  final  fitt  of  the  poem.  This  theme 128
corresponds closely with the argument that is central to Boethius’ work, as he affirms 
that  it  is  detrimental  to  love  life  so  dearly  that  one’s  happiness  depends  on  a 
knowledge of its prolonged continuance.  129
As a Christian Platonist, Boethius argues that immortality of the soul allows 
man to find a source of happiness that does not perish at the at the prospect of death. 
And because of this, Boethius says that man should have an imperishable happiness, 
that cannot be affected even by the possibility of death:
It  is  clear,  then,  that  if  transitory  happiness 
ends  with  the  death  of  the  body,  and if  this 
means  an  end  of  all  happiness,  the  whole 
human race would be plunged into misery b 
death.  But  if  we know that  many men have 
sought  the  enjoyment  of  happiness  in  death, 
how can this present life make us happy when 
its end cannot make us unhappy?130
Boethius’ argument reveals why Gawain was misguided in loving his life too dearly. 
The Christian is bound to revere life, but he should not reverence it as his highest 
good. It is the peculiar quality of both works that they point towards higher goods 
than  this  temporal  world,  and  yet  neither  fall  into  a  discussion  on  eschatology. 
Boethius  wrote  a  number  of  explicitly  theological  works  before  composing  The 
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Consolation,  and likewise the Gawain-poet also wrote a number other works that 131
are overtly theological.  The narratives of SGGK and The Consolation are however, 132
stories are far more pragmatic, interested more in ethics than doctrine. These more 
‘secular’ works reflect the deep interest both men had in the practicalities of virtuous 
living. Michael D. Cherniss notes this quality in Boethius: 
The  purpose  of  the  Consolation  is 
essentially  practical;  it  attempts  to  resolve 
philosophical  problems  pertaining  to  life  in 
this  world.  The  little  theological  material 
present - discussions of the nature of God and 
his  Providence  -is  limited  to  that  which 
provides  a  necessary  foundation  for  inquiry 
into Boethius’s existential problems, and it is 
discovered  by  rational,  philosophical 
methodology. 133
SGGK is likewise interested in practical theology, that is the ethics of right living. The 
poet  focuses  on  showing Gawain’s  journey towards  a  correct  attitude  to  his  own 
mortality.134
Chapter 2 
     - De Trinitate  131
       - Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de divinitate substantialiter praedicentur  
- Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint cum non sint substantialia bona   
- De fide Catholica 
- Contra Eutychen et Nestorium 
 The works of Pearl, Cleanness and Patience are all attiruvuted to the authorship of the Gawain poet, 132
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2.1 Temperance 
SGGK is a complex poem deeply engaged with many the of themes found across late 
fourteenth-century  literature.  Key  among  these,  often  relegated  in  contemporary 
scholarship,  is  that  of  moral  conduct,  both  public  and  private.  Each  fitt  of  the 
Romance places Gawain in a new moral dilemma, each of which is constructed in a 
way that  offers  the reader an insight  into the poem’s moral  framework.  Gawain’s 
successes and failures in the course of navigating these situations are built  on the 
poet’s understanding of the fundamental principals of each of the moral dilemmas 
presented,  and  the  related  virtues  they  require.  The  first  chapter  of  this  thesis 
addressed the poet’s reflections on the nature of fortitude by contrasting Arthur and 
Gawain’s acceptance of the Green Knight’s challenge. It showed that underpinning 
the poem’s interest in the problem of facing death, is the idea that a willingness to die 
may only be counted as authentically courageous if it is for a worthy cause. Arthur’s 
willingness  to  risk  death  in  order  to  defend  the  reputation  of  his  court  from  a 
stranger’s  taunts  is  shown  to  be  an  act  of  recklessness.  In  accepting  the  Green 
Knight’s challenge, the king betrays his impulsive and imprudent character. Gawain’s 
actions,  by  contrast,  are  shown  to  be  an  example  of  authentic  fortitude,  being 
prompted to risk his life, not from a desire for glory, but because he deems it the only 
way  of  preserving  Arthur  from  harm.  It  is  at  this  point  of  divergence  and  by 
contrasting the conduct of Gawain and Arthur that the poet conveys the moral truth, 
that a willingness to die may only be considered courageous if the intended object is 
deserving of the risk. 
 By  a  similar  method  the  poet  incorporates  an  analysis  on  the  nature  of 
temperance  in  the  second  and  third  fitts  of  the  poem,  showing  that  just  as  a 
willingness to risk one’s life may only be judged courageous if the intended good is 
deserving of the risk, so also an act of restraint can only be considered as an instance 
of temperance if it is directed towards an authentic moral good. If Gawain were to 
show restraint for reasons that were themselves not of great moral weight, then the 
merit  of  the  act  would  significantly  diminish.  From this  perspective  on  Gawain’s 
interaction  with  Lady  Bertilak  the  poet  offers  the  reader  a  clarification  of  the 
important role prudence in action in tension with the chivalric code.  When Gawain 135
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seeks the refuge of Lord Bertilak’s castle as an escape from the trials of his difficult 
winter journey, he finds himself troubled by a greater ordeal manifest in the sexual 
advances  of  his  host’s  wife.  On  three  consecutive  mornings  Gawain  guards  his 
chastity by refusing her increasingly overt, and tempting, offers of a sexual encounter. 
A large section of the poem is devoted to these interactions, and these are grounded in 
the  poet’s  understanding  of  the  nature  of  temperance,  woven  playfully  into  the 
predicament in which he has placed his  hero.  Just  as Gawain’s true motives in 136
accepting the Green Knight’s challenge revealed the validity of his courage, so too an 
analysis of Gawain’s motives for refusing the lady will reveal the complex character 
of the virtue temperance that he possesses. 
In evaluating Gawain’s motives for acting chastely, Carolyn Dinshaw looks to 
the initial agreement made between Gawain and his host. At his Christmas banquet 
Sir Bertilak proposes a bargain with Gawain, wherein anything won in the following 
three days by either  party must  be forfeited to the other  (1105 – 1123).  On each 
morning  of  the  three  days  Bertilak  goes  on  successful  hunting  expeditions.  He 
presents to Gawain the game that he catches, and Gawain, who wins nothing more 
than kisses from the wife of his host, renders them to Bertilak. Dinshaw looks to this 
bargain as the reason for Gawain’s restraint, for if he had accepted anything more than 
a kiss from the lady he would have been bound by his promise to give that to his host 
also.  It is likely that the poet intended this bawdy joke, yet the seriousness of the 137
poem suggests that there are more earnest questions that the poet wishes to address, 
however playfully. 
It is clear that Gawain is sorely tempted by the advances of Lady Bertilak. 
When she presses upon him so persistently the poet says that he is in great danger of 
succumbing: 
For þat prynces of pris depressed hum so þikke,
Nurned hym so neȝe þe þred, þat need hyn bihoued
Oþer lach þer hir luf, oþer lodly refuse. (1770 - 1773)
The poet was in no way required by convention to have his knight refuse the lady. The 
literary culture in which he wrote did not expect or require a hero to be chaste—
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indeed the opposite is  more often the case in medieval  romance.  The medieval 138
tradition of courtly love frequently develops adulterous relations between knights and 
noble ladies.   The stories of Troilus and Criseyde and Tristan and Isolde are two 139
noteworthy examples among many in a long literary tradition that overtly idealised 
such relationships, and advanced concepts of both masculinity and femininity within 
them. In  the poem, the character  of  Gawain himself  is  aware of  the courtly  love 
tradition, and the lady goes so far as to remind him of it:
Sir, ȝif ȝe be Wawen, woner me þunkkez,
Wyȝe þat is so wel wrast always to god,
And connez not of companye þee costez undertake,
And if mon kennes yow hom to knowe, ȝe kest hom of your mind… 
(1481 - 14)
Dinshaw makes sense of  his  abstinence by noting the aversion he would have to 
extending any sexual favours, received by the lady, towards Sir Bertilak. Dinshaw’s 
argument suggests that, were there no promise of exchanged winnings, he would have 
had no occasion to refuse the lady.  This interpretation does not, however, seem to 
take into serious consideration Gawain’s  interest  the perfection of  virtues  that  his 
shield denotes. Furthermore, it present a less than realistic depiction of human nature. 
If  Gawain  was  willing  to  commit,  from the  moral  view point,  as  grave  a  sin  as 
adultery with Lady Bertilak, it would seem unlikely that he would have scruples about 
deceiving  his  host,  the  conventions  of  hospitality  notwithstanding.  It  seems 
unreasonable  to  suggest  that  wrapped  in  his  complex  of  morality  and  courtesy, 
Gawain might be willing to commit such a serious sin against morality, only to be 
held back by the rules of a game.
While  Dinshaw’s  arguments  present  helpful  insights  for  making  sense  of 
Gawain’s chaste behaviour, she does not take into account the broader presentation of 
his character by the poet, who it is generally agreed sought to portray Gawain as a 
man who “exemplifies both religious and social virtues.”  Gawain emerges in SGGK 140
as an archetypal figure of a natural man with genuine sexual urges, and who must, and 
does,  struggle  against  concupiscence.  The  suggestion  that  his  prime  reason  for 
refusing the lady was something less than a commitment to the virtue of chastity—
even if  this is  a moral stance informed by Gawain’s knowledge of his impending 
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death—diminishes or  ignores  the poet’s  careful  presentation Gawain’s  example of 
heroic temperance.  The poet’s playful irony is implied in his very choice of Gawain 141
as his hero in a story focused on one man’s struggle against concupiscence. Gawain’s 
literary character was underwent profound changes throughout the Middle Ages.  In 142
the early Arthurian tales of Chrétien    de Troyes, he is the example of restraint and 
propriety, by the fourteenth-century, however, he is frequently depicted as a licentious 
knight  governed  by  his  passions.  There  is  a  deliberate  aptness  in  the  poet’s 143
reinvention of  Gawain in  his  exploration of  the virtue of  temperance.  He takes  a 
knight  who originally  enjoyed high literary  repute,  but  who latter  fell  into  moral 
decline, and in Gawain the poet explores man’s inclination towards sin as well as his 
ability to rise above it. 
The  poet  probes  the  nature  and  psychology  of  temperance  through  the 
particular  manner  and  structure  of  Gawain’s  temptation  scenes.   When  Lady 144
Bertilak attempts to overcome Gawain’s virtue, she is checked by his restraint, and 
upon each occasion she suggests reasons other than a simple commitment to chastity. 
She implies that he refuses her either because he has another lover or because he does 
not consider her worthy of him (1529). There are two points that are made manifestly 
clear  by  Lady’s  Bertilak’s  suggestions.  The  first  is  that  they  were  clearly  not  his 
reasons for refusing her, and secondly, that were they the actual reasons, his restraint 
could in no way be lauded as an example of true moral temperance. When placing 
these suggestions in Lady Bertilak’s mouth, the poet draws a clear distinction between 
restraint (in the given situation) and the wider virtue of temperance. By contrasting 
the base motives that the Lady suggests with Gawain’s actual chaste intentions the 
poet, with a light touch, introduces the more serious question of the role of a clearly 
articulated intentionality in the moral life.  Gawain’s restraint towards the lady can 145
only be considered an act of true temperance because he had a moral purpose guiding 
him—rather than one of relative virtue within the code of courtly love. In the same 
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way, his  acceptance of  the Green Knight’s  challenge only qualifies as  courageous 
because his intention had been to divert Arthur from danger. The poet’s great success 
in exploring the intersection between polite social convention among the aristocracy 
and weighty moral issues should not detract from our appreciation of the importance 
of the latter to the success of the poem’s complex resolution of the inherent tensions 
between these sets of values.
By  exploring the ways in which comparable courses of action might have 
different moral or ethical implications the poet again incorporates the influence of the 
school of  thought directly or  indirectly derived from Thomas Aquinas’ thought.  146
Morgan rearticulates Aquinas’ view on virtue, noting: “An act that is grudging cannot 
for that reason be described as morally good. Virtue requires not only that we do what 
is good, but that we do it by reason of its goodness.”  In determining the virtue of 147
any moral act Aquinas frequently stresses the importance not only of the action, but 
more significantly the object of that action: 
…the primary goodness of a moral action is derived 
from  its  suitable  object  …  so  to  the 
primary evil in moral actions is that which is from the 
object…148
This  focus  on determining the  moral  value  of  an act  grounded in  an individual’s 
intention clarifies the distinction between restraint and temperance, and in turn reveals 
why it  was so important to the  Gawain-poet that he probe, by contrast,  Gawain’s 
reasons for refusing Lady Bertilak. Aquinas says that the miser who practices restraint 
in his enjoyment of food and drink, because of his frugal disposition, should not be 
called temperate.  He must look to the good of his soul if he is to show temperance 149
in avoiding drunkenness and gluttony. If he avoids excess in food and drink only out 
of a concern for his finance his moderation can only be called restraint, and restraint 
alone cannot be counted virtuous, for a man may exercise restraint to achieve a bad 
end, but a man acting with temperance is always directed towards the good. Aquinas 
affirms this when he states the inseparability of temperance from prudence.  A man 150
 Tison Pugh, “Gawain and the Godgames,” Christianity and Literature 51, no. 4 (2002): 525-51. 146
 Gerald Morgan, Idea of Righteousness, 127.147
 Aquinas, ST, I-II,18,2, ad. 1148
 Aquinas, ST, II-II,23, 7, c.o149
 Aquinas, ST, II-II,23, 7, ad. 1150
!53
may cannot possess temperance independently from prudence, for it is prudence that 
directs  the  temperance  towards  man’s  proper  end.  This  inseparability  should  not, 
however,  blur  the  necessary  distinction  between  prudence  and  temperance.  Josef 
Pieper provides a helpful explanation of their distinctness: 
Temperantia  is  distinguished  from  the  other 
cardinal virtues by the fact that it refers exclusively 
to  the  active  man himself.  Prudence  looks  to  all 
existent reality; justice to the fellow man; the man 
of  fortitude relinquishes,  in  self-forgetfulness,  his 
own possessions and his life. Temperance, on the 
other hand, aims at each man himself. Temperance 
implies  that  man should  look  to  himself  and  his 
condition,  that  his  vision  and  his  will  should  be 
focused on himself.151
Pieper’s definition of temperance builds upon Aquinas’ understanding of the virtue, 
that, to a large extent reflects the assumptions beneath the late medieval moral thought 
of the poem. The influence on the poet of Scholastic thinking about temperance as the 
virtue that looks to the interest of one’s own soul, provides an important context for 
the lengths he goes to when clarifying Gawain’s reasons for refusing the lady. Though 
little is known about the Gawain-poet’s personal biography it may safely be inferred 
that an such an educated late-fourteenth-century writer, whose moral interest is more 
overtly  on  show  in  Cleanness  and  Patience,  would  have  enjoyed  a  degree  of 
familiarity with the thought of Aquinas, or even direct knowledge of his more popular 
works. As Larry S. Champion notes, such a conclusion should be uncontroversial: 
[SGGK]  is  deeply  imbued  with  Christian  moral 
values  and  matters  of  contemporary  Christian 
concern.  So  pervasive  is  this  quality  that  critics 
now conclude that the author read considerably in 
the Summa Theologia of St. Thomas Aquinas, and 
throughout the theological treatises of the patristic 
writers.152
When the lady makes her first trial of Gawain’s temperance, she believes him 
disinterested because he is too preoccupied with his approaching death:
‘Þaȝ I were burde bryȝtest’ þe burde in myne hade.
Þe lasse luf in his lode for lur þa he soȝt
 Pieper, Cardinal Virtues, 147. 151
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Boute hone,
Þe dunte þat schulde hum deue,
And nedes hitmost be done. (1283 - 1287)
She does not attribute his restraint to a moral objection to adultery, but rather believes 
the imminence of his death is too great a distraction. It is less easy to say whether the 
lady’s sexual offers were ineffectual because Gawain was so taken up with thoughts 
of death. Though if his thoughts were focused only on his looming death, to such a 
degree that his concupiscible desires were not felt, it is unlikely that the poet would 
have  presented  him  with  such  presence  of  mind  to  discourse  with  the  lady  so 
courteously.  His  behaviour  points  to  a  full  presence of  mind.  He has  a  calm and 
jocund demeanour towards the lady, but this is only an appearance. He appears more 
aware of the peril his soul is in, and this deep awareness is reflected by the militaristic 
description of his tactful navigation of the situation: “þe freke ferde with defence, and 
feted ful fayre” (1282).
When the lady’s enticements fail, she questions Gawain’s very identity, not 
just as a Romance character, but as a full-blooded man, with an authoritative tone that 
startles the knight. She uses this doubt as leverage to request a kiss, hoping by this last 
ploy to  overcome his  virtue.  But  Gawain remains  steadfast  and offers  her  only a 
chaste parting kiss:
Þen quoþ Wowen: ‘Iwysse, worþ as yow lykez; 
I schal kysse at your comaundement, as knyȝt fallez, (1302 – 1303)
The lady’s skepticism mirrors that of the Green Knight during his testing of Arthur’s 
court,  questioning their  reputation to provoke them to a reckless folly.  The stated 
incredulity of both these antagonists—so closely aligned in the poem’s over-arching 
story—is an important element of the poet’s exploration of the nature of Gawain’s 
virtue.  The Green Knight tests the fortitude of Arthur’s court by questioning their 
renown. If the knights show a willingness to die only for a noble cause, their fortitude 
might be deemed authentic, but if, on the other hand, they are willing to die for an 
ignoble cause, like a Christmas game, their readiness to die would not be courage, but 
rather recklessness. Aquinas clarifies this by stating that any willingness to die for a 
cause is only noble, if the cause itself is noble.  Similarly Lady Bertilak makes a 153
trial of Gawain’s temperance to discover what moves him to respond chastely. For 
just as the knights’ readiness to die would only be courageous if it was for a noble 
cause, so too Gawain’s restraint would only qualify as temperance if it were for a 
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noble cause. Aquinas articulates the need for this clarification by enumerating the un-
virtuous motives that might prompt a man to act with restraint.  The attitudes and 154
words of the Green Knight and the lady facilitate a deeper understanding of fortitude 
and temperance by pointing to the deeper values at stake in their encounters: when 
one should have a willingness to risk life, and what reasons should motive restraint. 
The  virtue  of  temperance  is  explored  further  in  the  second  and  third 
encounters between the lady and Gawain. Lady Bertilak continues to probe the nature 
of  his  temperance  by  suggesting  a  variety  of  reasons  for  Gawain’s  restraint.  In 
context,  it  is  probably unsurprising that she never once suggests that it  is  love of 
virtue that motivates his refusal of her, though this studied silence on her part serves 
to draw attention to the question. When she enters his chamber the second time she 
again questions Gawain, and in a manner similar to the Green Knight’s, using the ploy 
of the false dilemma.  She asks why he does not speak to her of love, he who is so 
renowned for love speech. Either his reputation is falsely founded, and he has no 
understanding, or else he deems her too stupid to understand:
Why! Ar ȝe lewed, þat alle þe los weldez?
Oþer elles ȝe demen me to dille your dalyaunce to herken? (1528 - 1529)
In confronting Gawain in this way, she is not only testing his temperance but his 
courtesy too.  He must refuse her but without causing offence: that is, he must show 
temperance but also courtesy, at the point of tension and intersection between two 
codes of conduct. He accomplishes this by suggesting that she in fact knows more 
than he does in the matter of love speech, and he claims this as the reason for his 
reticence.   He is  forbidden by the rules of  courtesy to condemn the lady for  any 
impropriety, and so in refusing her he must not suggest that in any way she has acted 
amiss.  When she  offers  him her  body,  he  cannot  condemn the  immorality  of  the 
suggestion without  impoliteness,  or  indeed sanctimonious hypocrisy.  To spurn her 
offer would be discourteous, yet to accept it would be intemperate. Being loyal to 
both ideals he avoids the dilemma by saying he is unworthy of her love, and in this 
way he corrects her intemperance while maintaining his courtesy.  The artful way he 
navigates this socially problematic scenario is not dissimilar to his behaviour in the 
first  fitt  of  the  poem,  when  he  dissuades  Arthur  from  his  recklessness  without 
condemning  the  fault.  He  does  this  by  another  courteous  abnegation  of  his  self, 
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asserting that  such a lowly knight  as  himself  might  profit  more by the Christmas 
game. In these two episodes, the poet constructs scenarios wherein Gawain’s attempts 
to act courageously and temperately are problematized by his adherence to courtesy, 
and resolved by his ‘humility’.
2.2 Gawain’s humility
Gawain’s  success  in  navigating  these  dilemmas,  by  arguments  of  self-
deprecation, might suggest that the poet was holding Gawain up as the embodiment of 
another moral virtue, that of exemplary humility. A close analysis of the poem beside 
the medieval conception of humility does, however, point away from such a simplistic 
reading. As in the case of his exploration of fortitude and temperance, the poet invites 
a critique of the essential properties of the virtue of humility. In the Green Knight’s 
challenge, fortitude is shown to consist of a willingness to die, but he clarifies that it 
must be for a higher rational good. By the lady’s temptations the poet offers the view 
that temperance consists of restraining one’s desire for pleasure, while again including 
the element that it must be for the right reason that the restraint is practiced. And, in a 
like manner, it is through Gawain’s self-deprecating arguments that the poet evaluates 
the constituent parts of humility, and distinguishes it from false humility. The poet’s 
exploration of the virtue humility again reflects the deep impression of Scholastic 
moral  thought on this question had on his construction of these encounters in his 
poem.  155
Since the time of Chrétien    de Troyes, Gawain’s character had been firmly 
established as the knight of perfect courtesy and humility, providing a deep literary 
context for the self-depreciating way in which Gawain speaks at Arthur’s court. The 
subsequent events of the poem, however, call into question the depth of this humility 
in Gawain’s present incarnation. Gawain describes himself as the lowest of knights in 
Camelot,  a  claim  that  medieval  readers  would  have  recognized  as  exaggerated. 
Aquinas condemns such insincerity: “Humility, in so far as it is a virtue, conveys the 
notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place. Now this is sometimes 
done merely as outward signs and pretenses: wherefore this is false humility.”  The 156
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shallowness of Gawain’s humility is evinced by his subsequent donning of the shield, 
which suggests that his self-abasement was mostly outward show. His actions imply 
that he possesses the perfections epitomized in his shield, though this self-belief is 
discovered to be problematic by the end of the poem. This lack of self-knowledge 
reflects  Aquinas’ view  that  humility  lies  not  in  outward  words  but  rather  in  an 
authentic  knowledge and proper  view of  oneself.  “[the humble man] restrains the 
impetuosity of his soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is in the 
cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above what we are.”  157
This is the fault that Gawain proves guilty of, and it  is this discovery of his own 
imperfection that is so significant to the narrative thrust and character development 
across the poem. Gawain’s transition in outward symbol from the shield of perfection 
to the girdle of imperfection reflects his acquisition of self-knowledge, a pre-condition 
of authentic humility.  Gawain is not truly humble at the beginning of the poem, 158
because he is not aware of his limitations. The transition rests on a movement in the 
poem from the humility required as part of courteous speech, to a deeper humility of 
character. 
Gawain’s mistaken view of himself, embodied in his shield, is reformed by the 
end of the poem, as he returns to court wearing the green girdle. This need for self-
realization evokes an understanding of humility like that outlined by Bonaventure’s in 
his Holiness of Life:
To see personal defects aright a man must feel himself 
humbled under the mighty hand of God…I admonish 
you, therefore, the moment you realize your failings to 
humble yourself in abject humility and acknowledge to 
yourself your utter worthlessness.159
Bonaventure quotes St. Bernard of Clairvaux’s description humility: “the virtue which 
prompts a man possessing an exact knowledge of himself.”  The end of the poem 160
makes  it  evident  that  Gawain had not  earlier  possessed this  knowledge,  when he 
painfully  recognizes  that  he  has  deceived  himself,  thinking  himself  to  be  more 
virtuous than he was. Gawain displays fortitude and temperance throughout the poem, 
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but it  is not until this narrative moment of self-realization that he shows enduring 
humility. 
2.3 The Lady’s final visit
The  final  visitation  of  the  lady  in  SGGK  completes  the  evaluation  of  Gawain’s 
temperance (1750). She makes a last trial of his virtue, and when again she is rebuffed, 
she asks him if he has a lover. “Bot if ȝe haf a lemman, a leuer, ȝat yow lykez better 
and folden faith to þat fre” (1782 - 1783).  Fidelity to another woman is the final 
possible reason which Lady Bertilak offers for Gawain’s restraint; as has been noted, 
she never allows the possibility that his restraint is motived by a simple adherence to 
virtue. In this final encounter, the poet stresses how affected Gawain is by the lady’s 
advances, “wiȝt wallande joye warmed his hert.” The knight’s cause is so desperate 
that he is said to be lost without Mary’s intercession, “Gret perile bitwene hem stod, 
nif Mare of hir knyȝt mynne” (1766). In describing the scene so desperately, the poet 
imbues the moment with a dramatic tension, inviting the reader to wonder, like the 
lady, what motive has so strengthened his resolve. 
At  this  climactic  point  in  the  narrative,  the  poet  gives  a  brief  glimpse  of 
Gawain’s interior dialogue to explain his reasons: 
For þat prynces of pris depressed hum so þikke,
Nurned hym so neȝe þe þred, Þat need hym bihoued 
Oþer lach þer hir luf, oþer lodly refuse.
He cared for his cortaysye, lest craþayn he were,
And more for his meschef ȝif he schulde make synne,
And be traytor to þat tolke þat þat telde aȝt. (1770 - 1776)
The reasons for Gawain’s course of action are here made explicit: it was for love of 
virtue that he abstained from the lady’s offers, and at this climactic moment the poet 
suggests his abstinence reflects authentic temperance, rather than simple self-restraint. 
The  precedence  he  gives  to  chastity  over  courtesy  reveals  his  faithfulness  to  his 
Christian religion. Derek Pearsall,  however, rejects this understanding, even in the 
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voice of the poet, in a reading of the poem that relegates its Christian themes. Pearsall 
suggests that Gawain simply practices the tenets of his faith, as every other Christian 
of that time would have. His attendance at mass and confession to the priest, Pearsall 
insists, should be read as nothing more than an adherence to the conventions of his 
time: 
[Gawain’s faith] provides the rituals that structure 
the day and year, a range of mantras and charms 
that  gives  reassurance  in  times  of  danger,  and 
opportunities for a strictly codified versions of the 
inner  life  to  be  hauled  to  the  surface  for 
inspection and dismissal. 161
Pearsall’s  argument  downplays  the  importance  of  deeper  Christian  themes  that 
pervade the entire poem, which,  are essentially dismissed,  from a modern secular 
critic’s  viewpoint,  as  part  of  the  poem’s  undifferentiated  and  uncritical  medieval 
cultural  baggage.  Such  a  dismissal  undoubtedly  does  the  poet  and  his  poem  a 
disservice, and obscures the poet’s own careful treatment of the nuances of moral 
conduct  in  his  own time.  I  would  argue,  however,  that  the  particular,  rather  than 
general, nature of Gawain’s faith is the driving impetus behind each of his virtuous 
acts. Gawain’s temperance can only be made sense of in light of his own faith and his 
practice of it: “And more for his meschef ȝif he schulde make synne” (1774). This 
comment  suggests  that  Gawain’s  fear  of  falling  into  sin  was  the  predominant 
motivation for his temperance towards the lady, yet such a comment on the affects 
that the knight’s actions might have upon his soul make no sense from Pearsall’s point 
of  view.  However,  the  most  straightforward  way  of  explaining  Gawain’s  fear  of 
falling  into  sin  is  to  accept  that  he  is  presented  with  a  genuine  concern  for  his 
salvation, and that his faith was something integral to his characterization, guiding his 
moral decisions. 
2.4 The poet’s unity of purpose
The temptation scenes test the strength of Gawain’s temperance, and his response to 
these tests directly determines his fate when he meets with the Green Knight. Rather 
than testing his patience, generosity, kindness or any other virtue, the poet instead 
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chooses to test Gawain’s temperance, just as he purposefully had chosen to test his 
fortitude in the beheading game. This decision to prioritise trials that would explore 
the cardinal virtues, presents another and more complex instance of the influence of 
Scholastic  thought  upon  the  poet’s  construction  of  Gawain’s  character.  Scholastic 
theologians were greatly interested in the cardinal virtues, exploring how they could 
open new approaches to moral theology. Rather than simply delineating the duties of 
man in commandments and obligations, the Scholastics treatment of moral philosophy 
gave definition to a more comprehensive knowledge of man’s nature through showing 
what his perfect state should look like.  The influence of Scholasticism upon the 162
moral thought of the poet is shown not only in his structuring of the temptation scenes 
(and Gawain’s dilemma in them), but also in the events in the Green Chapel that the 
seduction game precipitates.
Gawain receives a small nick upon his neck by the Green Knight’s axe, rather 
than losing his  head,  as  he had expected.  The reason the Green Knight  gives for 
affording him this leniency is the smallness of Gawain’s fault (2309 – 2315). He has 
remained chaste towards the lady,  but  has broken his  truth with Bertilak.  Gawain 
discovers  himself  not  to  be  a  triumphant  hero  even  in  the  moral  sphere.  He  has 
succeeded in  avoiding the  deadly  sin  of  adultery,  but,  as  the  nick  upon his  neck 
signifies, he is guilty of a lesser sin in breaking his “truth” in relation to his host’s 
game. The poet’s intention to highlight the distinction between mortal and venial sins 
further emphasises his influence by Scholastic thought, though such a distinction had 
existed long before the Scholastics explored it. Aquinas provides a detailed discussion 
of the gradation of sin, and affirms that, because actions differ in their object, sins 
must  also  differ  in  their  species,  according  to  their  object.  This  nuanced 163
understanding of sin become embedded in the complex intricacies of medieval moral 
theology; the poet conveys an appreciation of this complexity at the end of the poem, 
when  Gawain  and  the  knights  of  Camelot  disagree  on  the  degree  of  Gawain’s 
culpability (2513 – 2516). The poet reveals his sophisticated interest in this kind of 
problem. Gawain could have either passed the test and proved his excellence, or failed 
the test and lost his head, but instead the poet leaves the reader with an ambiguous 
ending that seems superficially inconclusive.   164
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At the poem’s conclusion, it is not easily evident whether Gawain should be 
viewed as an exemplar of virtue or as an imperfect knight, and it is in this ambiguous 
ending that the influence of the paradigms of Scholastic moral thinking become most 
apparent.   The pre-eminent Scholastics of the high Middle Ages had a keen interest 165
in exploring the nuances of moral theology:  understanding the distinction between 166
sins of commission and omission, sins against oneself or one’s neighbour, sins that are 
venial  and  those  that  are  mortal.  It  is  towards  a  deeper  understanding  of  these 
distinctions that the ambiguous ending of the poem is directed. Tolkien writes on the 
poet’s intention of exploring these distinctions:
 The temptation was to  this  poet  the raison 
d’être  of  his  poem;  all  else  was  to  him 
scenery,  background,  or  else  machinery:  a 
device  for  getting  Sir  Gawain  into  the 
situation which he wished to study.167
The situation itself is, however, a particularly unique one. Tolkien observes that it is 
not without reason that Gawain is tempted within the context of game. In Marie de 
France’s Arthurian Lay, Guinevere approaches the knight Lanval to make him her 
lover, and in such a forward way that it was difficult for him to refuse her without 
causing offence.  The situation is similar to Gawain’s predicament in SGGK,  but 168
with two significant differences. The most evident distinction is that Lanval failed 
where Gawain succeeds. Gawain maintains his courtesy without compromising his 
chastity, while Lanval caused bitter offence to Guinevere by his refusal, and in any 
case does not remain chaste. The second difference is, however, no less significant. In 
Marie de France’s Lay, Guinevere in fact wishes Lanval to be her lover, whereas in 
SGGK the lady only acts the part of a temptress, in order to test Gawain’s virtue. The 
fact that Gawain is being deliberately tested in these moments through an elaborate 
hoax emphasizes  the  significance  of  the  test  and makes  the  reader  scrutinize  and 
reassess his behaviour.
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 Chaucer achieves a similar effect at  the end of The Clerk’s Tale ,  in his 169
version of the story of the king Walter who takes the peasant Griselda as his wife. The 
condition he makes for  their  marriage is  that  she would obey and respect  him in 
everything unquestioningly. After their marriage, he proceeds to take away each of 
their children, leading Griselda to believe that they have been put to death. He then 
dismisses his wife and makes plans to wed another, all this he does in order to test her 
fidelity towards him and see how she responds under such adversity. This ploy is only 
revealed to her and the reader at the end of the story, the knowledge of which prompts 
the reader to reassess her behaviour and reflect further on how she responded to each 
situation. In both SGGK and The Clerk’s Tale the contrivance of a test is used in order 
to  focus  the  reader’s  attention  on  reassessing  the  protagonists’  behaviour,  and 
critiquing their moral integrity. Griselda emerges blameless—at least on the surface—
while Walter appears as some kind of emotional and moral monster.170
 The reader of Marie’s Lanval is, on the other hand, less inclined to reassess 
the discourtesy of Lanval because his encounter with Guinevere was not framed as a 
test; for she did in fact wish to seduce him. The framing of Gawain’s temptations 
within a test shows the importance of his response and the poet’s interest in eliciting 
the  reader’s  critique  of  that  response.  Furthermore,  it  should  be  recognised  that 
Gawain’s ignorance that he was being tested itself dictates aspects of his response. 
The testing of Gawain’s virtue may be summarized in three temptations. The first is 
his temptation to preserve his life through breaking his promise with the Green Knight 
by not seeking out the Green Chapel; his second temptation is the sexual advances of 
Lady Bertilak; and finally he is tempted to conceal the gift of the green girdle from Sir 
Bertilak. It is significant that of these three temptations the last is the only one that he 
gives in to, for though all three temptations were contrivances to test his virtue, it is 
only  in  the  case  of  the  last  (the  exchange  of  winnings)  that  he  knew  himself 
constrained by the rules of a game. In each test a different matter is also at stake; in 
keeping his word with the Green Knight it is his life that is in jeopardy, with the test 
of his chastity towards Lady Bertilak it is his soul that stands in danger, and with his 
promise of exchanged winnings with Sir Bertilak it is only his integrity in maintaining 
the rules of a game that are at stake when he decides to retain the girdle. Each of the 
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three tests may, however, can be reduced to Gawain’s struggle to adhere to the rules 
he is bound by, and it is this struggle that constitutes the central tension of the poem. 
Each system of rules is in itself not easy to easy to adhere to, but what complicates the 
plot of SGGK is the fact that the rules Gawain strives to keep often are so often in 
tension  with  one  another;  by  maintaining  one  set,  he  can  easily  meant  breaking 
another. 
Tolkien divides these “rules” into three categories. The rules of morality that 
Gawain must keep as a Christian, the rules of courtesy he must maintain as a knight 
and  rules  of  the  game  as  prescribed  by  Bertilak.  It  is  by  understanding  the 171
distinction of these rules and the poet’s intention for bringing them into conflict the 
reader  is  at  a  greater  advantage  in  discerning  the  poem’s  general  theme.  The 
distinction between breaking rules of morality, or simply the rules of a game is a 
discussion that  the  poet  invites  the  reader  to  reflect  upon,  and he  does  this  quite 
deliberately by through his inclusion of the confessional scene. Upon the first reading 
of the poem the reader may think that Gawain’s confession to the priest is recounted 
simply in  order  to  show how certain  he was of  his  own death (1902 -1912).  And 
though this effect is certainly conveyed, the poet is intending to achieve much more. 
The timing of the confession signifies the response that the poet wishes to produce in 
the reader. Soon after breaking the rules of the game with Sir Bertilak, Gawain visits 
the priest in the confessional. This sequence of events leaves the reader wondering 
whether  Gawain’s  misdemeanour  qualifies  as  a  moral  transgression,  deserving  of 
mention in the confessional.  What he discloses (or neglects to disclose) is, however, 
not revealed, the confessional seal remains unbroken. The reason for this omission is 
clearly not out of respect for a fictitious character’s privacy. It might seem strange that 
a poem that is so preoccupied with morality should neglect to detail so pivotal a point 
in the story. Gawain’s retention of the green girdle was understood to be a fault, but 
the severity of that fault is disputed by Gawain and the other knights at the end of the 
story, and their disagreement has in led to a wipe scope of interpretations by critics 
seeking to evaluate the poem. It might be thought that the poet made a significant 
oversight in failing to divulge the details of the confession, and that the didactic merit 
of  the  narrative  diminished  significantly  by  his  silence.  A moral  evaluation  of 
Gawain’s behaviour would surely have been simpler had the reader known the details 
of the confessional; but the poet does not offer this. The poet develops a clear model 
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of what virtues such as fortitude and temperance should look like, but in no way does 
he suggest that the interior aspect of moral behaviour is an easy matter to understand.  
The poem’s discourse of morality is comprehensive, differentiating courage 
and recklessness, temperance and restraint, and yet at the end of the poem the poet 
frustrates  any  desire  on  the  reader’s  part  for  a  concrete  evaluation  on  Gawain’s 
culpability  in  retaining  the  girdle.  The  poet  achieves  this  by  his  silence  towards 
Gawain’s confession and the laughter of the knights at Gawain’s scruples. Throughout 
the  story,  Gawain  is  led  into  compromising  situations,  and  in  each  instance  he 
demonstrates  his  virtue  by  the  nature  of  his  responses.  He  acts  commendably  in 
honouring his word with the Green Knight, he showed his integrity in refusing Lady 
Bertilak and in all but the green girdle he kept his word with Sir Bertilak. The poem is 
not  about  moral  ambiguity,  it  is  rather  instead  interested  in  the  ambiguity  of 
understanding the workings of another’s conscience. It is not clear whether the poet 
intends Gawain’s final fault to be viewed as a condonable foible, or a serious offence, 
inviting the contrition that Gawain shows. If the poet had admitted the reader into the 
confessional  it  would likely have resolved much of  the poem’s ambiguity on this 
point.  But one of the central themes of the poem would have been lost in such a 
clarification:  if  the  reader  fully  understood  Gawain’s  fault,  the  ambiguity  and 
confusion that the poet works so artfully to achieve would be lost.  The reader is not 172
left doubting the poet’s belief in the existence of objective morality, but he is left with 
a degree of doubtfulness on the ability to arrive at concretely accurate evaluations of 
all human actions.
An  example  of  the  ambiguity  that  is  created  by  Gawain’s  unknowable 
confession emerges in the contrasting (and speculative) interpretations of Tolkien and 
Gollancz. The two agree that it is unlikely that Gawain mentioned the girdle in his 
confession, for if he had, the priest would have required him to return it. As Claudius 
asserts in Hamlet, one cannot ask for forgiveness while retaining the possessing you 
are contrite for obtaining.   “May one be pardon'd and retain the offence?” . Though 173
Tolkien and Gollancz agree on the likelihood that Gawain omitted the girdle from his 
confession  of  sins,  their  evaluations  of  his  silence  could  not  be  more  different. 
Gollancz is of the opinion that Gawain’s failure to acknowledge the fault of the girdle 
would have invalidated his entire confession. He adds furthermore that this was an 
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oversight of the poet. He believes that the poet recounts Gawain’s confession to show 
his preparation for the possibility of death. Gollancz maintains that the poet made a 
neglectful oversight by failing to notice that Gawain had already accepted the girdle 
when he went to confession. “Though the poet does not notice it Gawain makes a 
sacrilegious confession. For he conceals the fact that he has accepted the girdle with 
the intention of retaining it.”  174
Tolkien  on  the  other  hand  argues  that  the  poet  intentionally  inserts  the 
confessional scene at this point in the narrative so that the reader might give thought 
to the immorality or amorality of Gawain’s actions. Tolkien concedes that nothing can 
verifiably be asserted about what was said in the confession, he does, however, note 
that, regardless of what was said, the poet makes it clear the confession was valid: 
Since the author does not specify what Gawain 
confessed, we cannot say what he omitted, and 
it is therefore gratuitously silly to assert that he 
concealed anything. We are told, however, that 
he  schewed  his  mysdedez,  of  þe  more  and  þe 
mynne, that is, that he confessed all his sins (sc. All 
that  it  was  necessary  to  confess)  both  great  and 
small.175
Tolkien  maintains  this  argument  on  the  grounds  that  when  Gawain  leaves  the 
confessional it is expressly clear the that confession was valid:176
There  he  cleanly  confessed  him  and  declared  his 
misdeeds, both the more and less, and for mercy he 
begged, to absolve him of them all he besought the 
good man;  and he assoiled him and made him as 
sage and as clean as for Doom’s day indeed, were t 
due on the morrow. (1880 - 1884)
The validity of Gawain’s confession is emphasised in order to make more apparent 
the  distinction  between  a  moral  transgression  and  breaking  the  rule  of  a  game. 
Tolkien observes that it is at this point in the story that both Gawain and the reader are 
forced to realize the difference:
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Gawain’s confession is represented as a good one, 
then.  Yet  the  girdle  is  retained.  This  cannot  be 
accidental or inadvertent. We are obliged therefore 
to  come  to  terms  with  the  situation  deliberately 
contrived by the author; we are driven to consider 
the  relation  of  all  these  rules  of  behaviour,  these 
games and courtesies, to sin, morals, the saving of 
souls,  to  what  the  author  would  have  held  to  be 
eternal  and  universal  values.  And  that,  surely,  is 
precisely why the confession is  introduced, and at 
this point. Gawain in his last perilous extremity was 
obliged to tear his ‘code’ in two, and distinguish its 
components of good manners and good morals.177
Even before his confession Gawain suffers the realization that his code of courtesy 
cannot  always  be  perfectly  practiced  in  accordance  with  chastity.  When  he  is 
confronted  by  the  lady,  he  seems  to  retain  his  courtesy,  but  it  is  really  only  the 
semblance of it. Courtesy, in the medieval understanding of the word, required the 
knight subservience to the wishes of his lady.  178
Gawain uses tact to navigate the predicament, and not give offence to the lady. 
But the tact cannot be properly described as courtesy, for he refused the wishes of the 
lady, which, is contrary to the practice of authentic courtesy. Tolkien notes Gawain’s 
departure from the requirements of courtesy:
[He] has in reality abandoned from the outset 
‘services’, the absolute submission of the ‘true 
servant’ to  the  will  and  wishes  of  the  lady; 
though  he  strives  throughout  to  maintain  the 
verbal  shadow  of  it,  the  gentleness  of  polite 
speech and manners.179
 It cannot be doubted that he chose rightly when preferring rules of morality over 
those over courtesy. The poem develops in a way that makes it clear that the moral 
law rightly has precedence over social law of courtesy. When Gawain is presented 
with the green girdle he is again confronted with a choice, though this time it is not a 
matter of courtesy and morality, but simply the rules of a game contrived by his host. 
The girdle seems to promise Gawain an escape from his fate at the green chapel, and 
for this reason he is quite naturally inclined to accept the gift. The lady had previously 
been tempting him to what he knew to be clearly sinful, but in offering the girdle she 
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did not ask him to break any rules of morality, only the rules of her husband’s game. 
Accepting the girdle did not seem to contravene his conscience and so he accepts the 
girdle, at which point the lady immediately demands that he tells no one of it, but 
keeps it hidden.  To keep the girdle hidden from his host would break the rules of the 
game  they  had  agreed  upon,  and  Gawain  does  this  with  little  compunction.  The 
decision,  to  preserve  his  life  at  the  cost  of  breaking  the  rule  of  a  game,  seems 
justifiable, not only excusable but even reasonable. It would have been very different 
had the lady offered him protection under the condition that he take her as his lover. 
Gawain’s desire to live would need to have been weighed against the desire to 
preserve his virtue.  This is, however, not the dilemma that the poet places Gawain in. 
He has to decide, rather, if he is more committed to maintaining the rules of a game 
than he is his own life. This, Tolkien observes, is the peculiar crux of the poem upon 
which  the  narrative  centres,  and  through  it  the  poet  manifests  a  keen  interest  in 
exploring the particularities of moral action: 
Nothing in his  handling of  his  tale suggests 
that  he thought moral  conduct  a  simple and 
painless  thing  in  practice.  And  anyway  he 
was,  as  we  might  say,  a  gentleman  and  a 
sportsman,  and  was  intrigued  by  the  minor 
issue.  Indeed  the  moralitas  of  his  poem,  if 
complicated,  is  yet   also  enriched  by  this 
exhibition  of   a  clash  of  rules  on  a  lower 
plane.180
There seems nothing gravely wrong in accepting the girdle, and yet by the end of the 
poem Gawain shows deep remorse for the action. His chief fault is not, however, the 
accepting of the girdle. Tolkien suggests that because the Green Knight used magic in 
the first beheading scene, it cannot be thought unjust for Gawain to resort to it too.  181
It was not then the initial accepting of the girdle for which Gawain is at fault. It is 
rather his wilful deception of Bertilak, when he retains the girdle, that is the fault of 
which  he  later  repents.  Tolkien’s  problematizes  a  simple  reading  of  this  fault, 
however, by noting that Gawain gave his promise that he would tell no one of the 
girdle. This means that he either had to break his courtesy to the lady by going back 
upon his oath, or else break the rules of the game with Bertilak. Tolkien goes on to 
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affirm that when two laws are in conflict, it is the higher one that should be obeyed.  182
Gawain deemed courtesy towards the lady the higher law and chose to break the rules 
of the game. It is, however, made evident by the end of the poem that this was a fault, 
for  his  failure to keep his  promise was ultimately a failure to maintain a balance 
between the competing rules that  he had bound himself  by.  The artificial  rules of 
courtesy that demand deference, do not mitigate Gawain from his offence. Tolkien 
notes that the laws of morality have a ‘universal overriding validity’.  That is to say, 183
it is right to give them precedence, and in doing so one is excused from trespasses 
upon lower laws. But the laws of courtesy are distinct from those of morality.  They 184
are not so high as to excuse one from breaking the rules of a game. 
 The laws of morality are higher than social laws, and for this reason Gawain 
rightly prefers chastity over courtesy in his encounters with the lady. And he likewise 
would have been excused for breaking the rules of the game if they had in any way 
demanded a compromise of virtue, but there was nothing immoral in surrendering the 
girdle to Bertilak. He retained the girdle to avoid death, not sin. At this point it is 
natural to question whether in fact it is reasonable to die rather than break the rules of 
a game. For this it is necessary to understand an important element of the poet’s world 
view. Gawain’s shield reflects his commitment to trouthe, not only in the moral sphere 
but within the context of courtesy also and games.  The image of the pentangle is 185
one of all-embracing perfection. All the points of the pentangle are connected, and if 
one  is  broken,  the  unending knot  is  broken.  Consequently,  Gawain  binds  himself 
through this emblem to maintain his trouthe in all situations. Fear of death does not 
excuse him from abiding by the truth. Pieper affirms that true fortitude consists in 
“not allowing oneself to be forced into evil by fear, or to be kept by fear from the 
realization  of  good.”  Mark  Miller  sees  Gawain’s  fortitude  as  a  fruit  of  his 186
commitment to twawthe:
What  makes  Gawain  an  icon  of 
knightly   trawthe   is  that  he  refuses  to  be 
compelled by the most  compelling forces at 
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work in him—here, his natural desire for self-
preservation; earlier in the poem, his equally 
natural desire for sexual pleasure. 187
Gawain shows a commitment to trouthe in seeking out the green chapel, but the real 
trial of his trouthe is in his dealings with the lady. The Green Knight explains the 
correspondence between the three swings of the axe with the three times he resists the 
lady, and the nick on his neck as a result of his small fault of retaining the girdle. Ad 
Putter observes that he makes no comment upon Gawain keeping his word by seeking 
out the Green Chapel.  This significant omission is not meant to suggest that it was 188
not an act of heroic virtue, maintaining his truth, but rather to emphasise that this was 
not the significant trial. The poet allows the reader to think that the climax of the story 
was when Gawain stoops to receive the blow, but the Green Knight reveals to both 
Gawain and the readers that the real climax, the real test lay in his dealings with the 
lady. Putter discusses the centrality of Gawain’s trial with the lady:
In a startling reversal of expectation, the Gawain-poet 
reduces  the  Beheading  Game  to  an  adventure  of 
secondary importance,  while elevating an apparently 
minor  digression  at  the  Castle  Hautdesert  to  the 
pivotal scene…Gawain’s crucial test, then, takes place 
in  mundane  circumstances,  circumstances  so  utterly 
unportentous that  their  importance is  never  properly 
recognized  by  Gawain  or  the  reader  until  after  the 
fact.189
Tolkien had also affirmed that Gawain’s temptation with the lady as the central theme 
of  the  poem,  arguing  that  everything  else  in  the  plot  acts  only  to  frame  those 
temptation  scenes.  It  must  be  observed  though  that  there  were  two  distinct 190
temptations that Gawain was beset by. The lady first offered him her body, and when 
he refused that, she offered her girdle. These two temptations are significant because 
by them Gawain’s commitment to trouthe is fully tested, and the test is all the more 
perfect because of Gawain’s ignorance. Gawain and the reader are both led to believe 
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that his true test is in his dealings with the Green Knight, and that his stay at the castle 
is a moment’s respite from the challenge. 
The lady tempts him with her body on three mornings, and when on the third 
day she is  refused she offers  her  girdle  instead.  In  these two distinct  temptations 
Gawain learns two truths. Tolkien affirms that by his success in the former trail he 
learns the potential discordance between courtesy and virtue:
The  author  is  chiefly  interested  in  the 
competition  between  ‘courtesy’  and  virtue 
(purity  and  loyalty);  he  shows  us  their 
increasing divergence, and shows us Gawain at 
the crisis of the temptation recognising this, and 
choosing virtue rather than courtesy…191
Gawain realizes the moral imperative he is under to deny the lady, even at the risk of 
discourtesy. But in his failure to deny the girdle also, he does not immediately see his 
fault.  The realization of that fault is only reached when the Green Knight explains it 192
to Gawain. If these two temptations are the central theme of the poem it is useful 
exploring what truths the poet was intending to convey by them. Tolkien observed 
that the first trial emphasized the potential divergence of the moral and social code, 
and  the  imperative  to  preference  the  former.  In  tempting  Gawain  with  the  green 
girdle, the poet makes a trial of his honesty, deliberately framing it in the context of a 
game,  and  a  game  with  highest  of  stakes.  For  in  such  a  setting  it  seems  most 
excusable to break one’s truth. Tolkien, however, notes that though it might have been 
excusable for  him to practice imperfect  courtesy towards the lady,  if  it  avoided a 
compromise of his virtue, a compromise of trouthe should  never permitted. Putter 
notes this medieval preoccupation with truth: 
This  deep  moral  concern  with  trawþe  is  not  in  itself 
exceptional.  It  occupied  many  of  the  Gawain-poet’s 
contemporaries. Chaucer explored it in, for example, The 
Franklin’s Tale and Troilus and Criseyde; Langland did so 
in  Piers  Plowman;  and  Gower  wrote  in  his  Confession 
Amantis that: “Among the virtues on is chief, and that is 
trouthe….”193
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retaining it. But it might be presumed that when he accepted it, he thought to conceal it, else he would 
have little reason to accept it. Accordingly, we may speak of his fault in accepting it. 
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Putter  makes  the  argument  that  it  was  the  historical  events  surrounding  these 
medieval  poet’s  that  prompted  them  to  all  focus  so  intently  upon  the  theme  of 
truthfulness.  He affirms that the peasants revolt  of 1381 and general decay of the 
feudalistic structure was what led the poets to treat so intently of the need for truth: 
For  the  need  for  twawþe  –  whether  it  means  keeping 
promises or honouring the rules of a contract – becomes 
especially pressing or a society which has lost confidence 
in its immutability, and which is discovering that, without 
human truthfulness,  social  relations are as volatile as the 
changeable  human  needs  and  desires  that  bring  these 
relations into being.
Putter’s historic argument is pertinent, but seems to ignore the fact that in every age 
there is a clear need for truth. One could look at the events from any period of history 
to explain why that age in particular prized truth so highly. Every age for one reason 
or another has a particular need for prizing the virtue. Truth transcends history, its 
necessity is felt by every age.  There may be reason to doubt Putter’s argument as to 194
why this virtue was so prevalent in medieval literature, but that fact that “truth” was a 
popular topic among medieval poets cannot be denied.  195
Aquinas affirms that all lies, in one sense or another, are an offence to God 
who is truth itself. Aquinas makes no exceptions, even in the situation that confronts 
Gawain, already wrapped in lies and deceit, when a lie could perhaps save his life. 
“Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger 
whatever.”  Aquinas  divides  lies  into  three  categories;  the  officious  lie  that  is 196
intended towards a good end, the jocose lie that is not intended to be believed, and the 
mischievous lie that is directed towards an ill purpose. The lie that Gawain is guilty of 
could be categorized as an “officious” lie because it was intended towards the good of 
self-preservation, and intended no ill to others. Aquinas suggests that this motivation 
reduces the nature of the offence, but the lie still remains unlawful.  Aquinas, with 197
an eye on perfection, affirms that there is never an occasion that justifies the telling of 
a lie. The prudent omission of a truth is often necessary, but to speak a lie is always a 
sin of some degree. In the strictest sense, though, Gawain does not speak a lie, but 
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rather fails to fulfil a promise. Aquinas assimilates the breaking of a promise to lying, 
saying that the two are almost synonymous. The only distinction he makes is that 
there are two cases that make the breaking of a promise permissible. The first is when 
the speaker has promised to do that which is evil. Aquinas cites to Isidore: “Break 
your faith when you have promised ill.”  Evidently, it would be wrong to maintain a 198
promise to perform an evil act, out of a steadfast commitment to truth. 
From this perspective, in the Franklin’s Tale, Dorigen would be excused from 
her promise to commit adultery, because it was wrong to make such a vow. Gawain, 
however, could not be excused with an analogous line of argument, because he did 
not  commit  to  something  sinful  when  he  promised  to  exchange  winnings  with 
Bertilak, despite the blind nature of the promise. The second ground Aquinas offers 
for a promise to be lawfully broken is if the essential circumstances have altered since 
making the promise. If the changed circumstances are such that it is now impossible 
or unlawful to maintain the promise, then it there is not sin in breaking the promise. 
Aquinas draws on Seneca in support of this argument: 
For a man to be bound to keep a promise it is necessary for 
everything to remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he 
lie in promising-since he promised what he had in his mind, 
due  circumstances  being  taken  for  granted-  nor  was  he 
faithless in not keeping his promise, because circumstances 
are no longer the same.199
However, this second condition Aquinas allows for breaking “truth” might not excuse 
Gawain any more than the first. Being offered a girdle, even one that might save his 
life, does not alter the circumstances of his initial promise with Bertilak. Gawain’s 
crime can be  diminished from the  Thomistic  point  of  view,  however:  “Now it  is 
evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the sin of lying diminished in 
gravity.”200
Aquinas classes as a mortal sin all those lies told against one’s neighbour that have the 
intention of injury. He considers less grave those that are made with no evil intent: 
But if the end intended be not contrary to charity, neither 
will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a mortal sin, as 
in the case of a jocose lie,  where some little  pleasure is 
 Isadore of Seville, De Summo Bono, (New York: Penguin Classics, 1999), 11.198
 Aquinas, ST, II-II, 110, 3. s.c199
 Aquinas, ST, II-II, 110, 2. ad.2200
!73
intended, or in an officious lie where the good also of one’s 
neighbour is intended.201
From this viewpoint, Gawain’s retention of the green girdle would not constitute a 
grave offence. But while not a deadly sin, it still remains an imperfect action, a sin 
against  twawþe  and  a  blemish  on  the  perfection  claimed  by  his  shield.  That  the 
Gawain-poet shares this perspective is evident in the final fitt of the poem, when the 
Green Knight chastises Gawain for breaking his truth (2366). Gawain’s judge knows 
the reason that  prompted Gawain to accept  the girdle  (love of  life),  but  does not 
consider it enough to excuse him fully. By the slight wound delivered to Gawain’s 
neck, the poet’s moral code accords with Aquinas’ view that all broken promises are 
failings in the moral life. But the size of the wound is important: instead of beheading 
Gawain, the poet agrees with Aquinas that the officious lie is less severe than the 
mischievous lie. It is unlikely that the poet’s ethics are accidentally congruent with the 
dominant  understanding  of  moral  theology  in  the  late  Middle  Ages.  Even  if  the 
Gawain-poet  had  not  read  Aquinas’ works,  he  nevertheless  places  himself  in  the 
Scholastic and Thomistic tradition of thought.  202
The same perspective is evident in the poet’s presentation of Gawain’s desires. 
His desire for the good is often compromised by the desire for lesser goods. Gawain’s 
will desires the good of the virtue depicted on his shield, yet his flesh is tempted by 
the sensual good that the lady presents. Again, his desire for truth and integrity is 
compromised  by  his  desire  to  sustain  his  life,  which  entails  a  degree  of  deceit. 
Aquinas  reflects  at  length  on  the  movements  of  the  will,  and  is  likely  that  the 
influence of such ideas affected the poet’s representation to explore the passions of 
Gawain. Aquinas’ treatment of the complex question of man’s will helps to explain 
Gawain’s  response  to  the  temptations  of  the  lady.  Aquinas  uses  the  terms 
‘concupiscible’ and ‘irascible’ to denote the two kinds of appetite that man’s will can 
tend towards:
There is a passion through which the soul is simply inclined 
to seek what is suitable according to the senses, and to fly 
from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: 
and another whereby an animal resists the attacks of any 
agents that hinder what is suitable and inflict harm; and this 
is  called  the  irascible,  whence  we  say  that  its  object  is 
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something  arduous,  because  its  tendency  is  to  overcome 
and  rise  above  obstacles.  Now  these  two  are  not  to  be 
reduced  to  one  principal:  for  sometimes  the  soul  busies 
itself with unpleasant things against the inclination of the 
concupiscible appetite in order that, following the impulse 
of  the  irascible  appetite,  it  may  fight  against  obstacles... 
This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it 
were,  the  champion  and  defender  of  the  concupiscible, 
when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the 
suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against 
what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies.203
Aquinas’ evocation of  the hunted animal  is  perhaps telling,  and certainly offers  a 
striking coincidence with the poem’s employment of the same kind of questions. The 
concupiscible appetite refers then to the simple inclination towards a sensible object, a 
tangible  good  that  is  easily  attained.  When  the  desired  good  is  absent  the 
concupiscible appetite gives rise to desire, and when it is present joy results. In turn 
when an evil  thing is present sorrow is the result  and when it  is absent one feels 
aversion.  When Gawain wanders through the forest  suffering the hardships of  the 
weather he experiences a concupiscible appetite towards the simple good of food and 
shelter, this good is absent, which gives rise to desire, which is shown when he prays 
for shelter. (754 – 762)
The irascible appetite is distinct from the concupiscible, in that it accounts for 
the human response to those good things that  are difficult to attain and those evils 
that are difficult to avoid. When there is a possibility of enjoying that difficult good, a 
person experiences hope; when, however, the good seems impossible to grasp, one 
will experience despair.  Furthermore, when there is an evil that is difficult to avoid 
one  will  show courage  if  the  threatening  evil  seems conquerable,  and  fear  if  the 
threatened evil seems unconquerable. Aquinas uses this exposition of man’s passions 
to  explain  what  moves  man  to  feel  desire,  joy,  sorrow,  aversion,  hope,  despair, 
courage and fear. 
 This codified understanding the passions, ultimately derived from the Stoics, 
is embedded in the medieval understanding of human nature, composed of will and 
the capacity for action, experienced in a fallen nature and a world of temptation. The 
medieval  person  sought  to  make  sense  of  moral  action  by  formulating  complex 
systems that explained the cause for each passion. The poet’s interest in exploring the 
dilemma of the green girdle risks seeming trivial to the modern reader, unaware of the 
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medieval ordering of the passions and the rigid moral system that grew from it. C.S. 
Lewis explains the influence of this way of thinking in his discussion of the medieval 
impulse to codify their moral systems:
At his most characteristic, medieval man was not a dreamer 
nor a wanderer. He was an organiser, a codifier, a builder of 
systems. He wanted ‘a place for everything and everything 
in the right place’. Distinction, definition, tabulation were 
his  delight.  Though  full  of  turbulent  activities,  he  was 
equally full of the impulse to formalise them. War was (in 
intention)  formalised  by the  art  of  heraldry  and rules  of 
chivalry;  sexual  passion  (in  intention),  by  the  elaborate 
code of love.204
 
This medieval impulse to codify and systemise an understanding of human nature is 
shown explicitly in their medieval theology, and also poetry. 
When Gawain strives to remain chaste in the face of the lady’s seduction he 
experiences the struggle of the irascible passions. This temptation might seem initially 
an instance of the concupiscible passions, because it deals with something sensible, an 
apparent good that is easily attained. It is, however, an irascible passion that Gawain 
contends with, for it is made manifestly clear that the sin of un-chastity, that Gawain 
is so desirous of avoiding, is a difficult thing to attain.  The persistence of the lady’s 
suit, her charming manner and appearance, Gawain’s natural inclination to sensual 
pleasure,  and  his  adherence  to  the  standards  of  courtesy,  all  contribute  towards 
making the good of chastity a difficult good. Consequently, his passions towards that 
good must be understood as irascible. Aquinas suggests that a person is contending 
with an irascible passion when the good is difficult to attain or the evil difficult to 
avoid.  And when the evil it difficult to avoid, but not impossible, a person shows 205
courage  in  seeking  to  avoid  it.  Gawain’s  response  to  the  lady’s  temptations 
exemplifies  this  understanding  of  the  irascible  passions,  as  he  shows  courage  in 
remaining chaste, even though it proves difficult to do so. He shows courage because 
he had hope that he could succeed in attaining the difficult good of remaining chaste. 
In doing so he passes the primary test of virtue that Morgan le Fay had contrived. 
However, Gawain fails in the second test,  when he is offered the girdle, when he 
breaks his “truth” out of fear for his life. It is, furthermore, in this failure that the poet 
reflects  Scholastic  thinking  about  the  passions.  Gawain  accepts  the  green  girdle 
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because he is  in despair  for his life;  Aquinas teaches that  the irascible passion of 
despair arises when a man is confronted with an evil that seems impossible to avoid. 
Gawain suffers this despair because he sees no possibility of avoiding his death, so 
that this despair prompts him to the misdeed of accepting the girdle and keeping it 
secret. 
The courage and despair that Gawain shows when tempted by the lady, are 
both congruent with Aquinas’ explanation of the passions.  When presented with a 
difficult but not impossible good he shows courage, and in the face of a seemingly 
impossible good he feels despair. The poet does not, however, limit himself to simply 
explaining  the  causes  for  the  passions,  he  also  evaluates  the  fittingness  of  each 
passion, showing when one ought to show courage, and when despair is permitted. 
This is shown at the end of the story when Gawain’s conduct is critiqued, first by the 
Green Knight and then more sternly by Gawain’s own conscience. Gawain is praised 
by the Green Knight for showing courage in the face of the lady’s temptations:
Now know I wel þy cosses, and þy costes als,
And þe wowing of wyf: I wroȝt hit myseluen.
I sende hir to asay þe, and sothly me þynkkez 
On þe faultlest freke þat euer on fote ȝede… (2360 - 2363)
Gawain shows courage against the temptations of the flesh, but fear at the prospect of 
death of that same flesh. And though it seems reasonable that he should have been 
moved by fear to accept the girdle, the Green Knight identifies it as failing. Rather 
than limiting his  exploration to the cause of the passions,  the poet  also  seeks to 
evaluate the actions that result from them. The Green Knight recognises that Gawain 
did not take the green girdle out of covetousness or because he meant to woo the lady, 
but because feared to die, and for this reason he blames him less and only deals him a 
small nick on his neck as punishment: 
Bot here yow lakked a lyttel, sir, and lewte yow wonted;
Bot þat watz for no wylde wrke, ne wowying nauþer,
Bot for ȝe lufed your lyf; the lasse I yow blame. (2365)
Gawain chastises himself with far greater severity than the Green Knight. Believing 
the fault deserving of more than a small nick upon the neck he assumes the penance 
of returning to Camelot wearing the girdle for all to see as a token of his failing. At 
court Gawain uses the strongest language to condemn his own fault:
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Þis is þe laþe and þe losse þat I laȝt haue
Of couardise and coutyse þat I haf caȝt þare;
Þis is þe token of vntrawþe þat I am tan inne (2507-2509)
Furthermore, he says that he will wear this mark of his untruth for the rest of his days. 
The poet deliberately highlights the divergent views of Gawain and the Green 
Knight, and in doing so he leaves his readers with an enigmatic conclusion. It is not 
immediately clear which attitude the poet sympathises with, and what he intends to 
achieve by creating this disagreement.  The final fitts  of the poem relate Gawain’s 
return to court, where Arthur’s knights laugh at the severe attitude that Gawain takes 
towards his offence. If the laugher and condolence of the court had caused Gawain to 
throw off the girdle and laugh with the other knights, then the poem could be read as a 
warning against  scrupulosity.  But  the poet  does not  conclude the narrative in this 
manner,  and  Gawain  refuses  to  reconcile  himself  with  the  court’s  morality.  By 
concluding the poem with this unreconciled tension, the poet invites his readers to 
make sense of the disparity of opinions and determine which view point is correct. 
The  Green  Knight  acknowledges  that  it  was  not  out  of  lust  or  covetousness  that 
Gawain accepted the girdle, but only out of fear for his own life:
Bot here yow lakked a lyttel, sir, and lewte yow wonted;
Bot þat watz for no wylyde werke, ne wowing nauþer
Bot for ȝe lufed your lyf; the lasse I yow blame. (2366-2368)
And while it can be easily believed that Gawain should condemn his own lack of 
restraint if he had succumbed to the lady’s temptations, it is not immediately obvious 
why he vilifies himself so severely for acting out of fear of death. For while it is an 
intrinsic moral wrong to desire another man’s wife, there is nothing objectively evil in 
the wish to continue living. And if it was his love for life that moved him to break his 
truth by accepting the girdle, then the offence should not be considered a grave sin. 
This  is  the  view  point  of  all  the  knights  in  the  story  that  laughed  at  Gawain’s 
‘scruples’.  Gawain’s inability to adopt their  view point  only makes sense when 206
contextualised within the moral framework that the poet was writing in. Without such 
contextualising, the critic stands in danger of projecting contemporary ethics into the 
medieval poem. 
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In  order  to  understand  how the  fault  of  Gawain  should  be  evaluated,  the 
species of the fault must be understood. The Green Knight suggest that Gawain’s sin 
was his untruthfulness when he broke the promise to his host. If the fault was nothing 
more  than  this  small  deviation  from the  truth,  than  it  would  be  difficult  to  view 
Gawain’s remorse as anything but excessive scrupulosity. But Gawain is portrayed as 
a man who is deeply self-aware, and he could not have failed to see that it was fear 
that prompted his untruthfulness. He gave into fear and let it govern him, and it was 
because of this that he showed such grief. The untruthfulness that he committed in 
retaining the girdle was the fruit of him succumbing to the fear of death, but it is in 
the act  of being overcome by fear itself,  that  the essence of his  offence lay.  It  is 
necessary  to  stress  the  importance  of  this  distinction  in  order  to  make  sense  of 
Gawain’s remorse. He is grieved by his subservience to fear, rather than the particular 
offence that resulted from it. If the lady had told him that he would be preserved from 
harm if he stole an apple from an orchard, the offence might be considered as petty as 
breaking the rule of a game, but no doubt if  Gawain had done it,  he would have 
returned to Camelot with an apple hung on his neck. For he recognised the sinfulness 
of the smallest transgression that resulted from a submission to fear. It was the fault of 
his interior disposition that was his chief fault, rather than the particular falsehood he 
committed. Aquinas notes the importance of identifying the object of the sin, that is to 
say, what moves a person to sin: 
Now  voluntary   acts  differ  in   species   according  to  their 
objects.  Therefore  it  follows  that   sins   are  properly 
distinguished  in   species   by  their  objects….The  aspect 
of good is found chiefly in the end: and therefore the end 
stands in the relation of object to the act of the will which is 
at the root of every sin. 207
Fear itself might, however, be considered an inoffensive disposition, considering that 
scripture  itself  frequently  speaks  of  holy  men  fearing  God.  Aquinas,  however, 
distinguishes between godly and worldly fear, identifies the former as good because it 
reflects a fitting disposition of the creature towards the creator. God is man’s final end, 
and accordingly ought to be given due fear and reverence. Worldly fear on the other 
hand is the fruit of worldliness. The man that is governed by worldly fear places an 
inordinate value upon his temporal life: 
 Aquinas, ST I-II,72, 4. ad. 2.207
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Accordingly worldly love is,  properly speaking,  the love 
whereby  a  man  trusts  in  the  world  as  his  ends,  so  that 
worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of love, since 
man fears the loss of what he loves. Hence worldly fear is 
that which arises from worldly love as from an evil root, for 
which reason worldly fear is always evil.208
It is this worldly love that the Green Knight condones when he says “Bot for ȝe lufed 
your lyf; the lasse I yow blame” (2366). The disparity between the two opinions of the 
fault may then be understood to reflect the different moral plains of the knights. The 
Green Knight conveys a secular view point or morality, showing that without God 
Gawain’s worldly fear, and the untruthfulness that follows from it, would be of very 
minor significance. Indeed any scruples over such a small offence would be worthy of 
the laughter he is met with at the end of the poem by the other knights. By exploring 
Aquinas’ view towards worldly fear, one does, however, begin to make better sense of 
Gawain’s view point and catch a glimpse of the moral plane to which he was aspiring. 
It could hardly be expected that piety should abolish this natural response of 
fear to death. This is not though the opinion that either Aquinas or the Gawain-poet 
proposed. When fear prompts Gawain to commit a misdeed he holds himself at fault, 
but when he flinches beneath the Green Knight’s axe, he does not remonstrate himself 
for such an involuntary response. In this he again reflects the influence of Aquinas 
who states:
It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his body 
and loss of worldly goods,  but to forsake justice on that 
account  is  contrary  to  natural  reason.  Hence  the 
Philosopher says that there are certain things, viz.,  sinful 
deeds, which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such 
things is worse than to suffer any punishment whatever. 209
If  his  anxiety towards death had caused him to only flinch beneath the blade,  he 
would have had no occasion to criticize himself, but because he allowed his fear to 
drive him to the breaking of his truth, he realized that it was a moral failing. Aquinas 
states that it is not permissible to avoid death if the manner of avoidance is sinful.  210
One might perhaps argue that breaking the rules in a mere game could should not be 
considered gravely sinful. And this may be true, yet Aquinas did not state that an 
 Aquinas, ST, II-II,19,3. ad. 1208
 Aquinas, ST, II-II,19, 3 s.c209
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offense done out of fear is only wrong if the offense is of a serious nature. He states, 
rather, that any action done out of fear, that contravenes the moral law in the smallest 
way, is worse than any physical evil that the person fear. And this is the moral stand 
point that Gawain adopts at the end of the poem. Both Aquinas and the Gawain-poet’s 
unbending attitude also accord with Christ’s command “Do not be afraid of those who 
kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Instead, fear the one who can destroy both the 
soul and body in hell.”  It is ultimately within this Christian moral framework, that 211
commands fearlessness of the faithful, that the most sense can be made of Gawain’s 
attitude.  It  must  be  understood,  however,  that  this  ‘fearlessness’ does  not  mean a 
believer is expected have a stoical indifference to death, but rather that, despite any 
fear he might experience, he would not allow himself to fall into sin. Christ himself 
foresaw the pain of his Passion and experienced fear when he said “Father, if You are 
willing, take this cup away from me.”  Yet despite such fear he continued in the 212
Father’s  will.  The poet  must  have understood this  to be the perfect  expression of 
persevering towards the good in the face of death, for he concludes his narrative by 
reminding his readers of the salvation that Christ’s fortitude bought mankind. Now þat 
bere þe croun of þorne, he bring vus to his blysse! (2529)
This need for endurance in that face of death is the central theme of the poem, 
and though Gawain fails  the  test,  it  is  by his  steadfast  refusal  to  undervalue  this 
offence that the imperative nature of fortitude is most clearly shown. By allowing 
Gawain  to  fail  and,  what  is  equally  significant,  to  recognize  his  failure,  the  poet 
creates  a  clear  contrast  between  worldly  morality  and  the  more  rigidly  defined 
morality  taught  by  the  Scholastics.  When  the  knights  of  Camelot  laugh  at  his 213
‘scruples’ he remains silent, and it  is in this silence that Aquinas’ thought is most 
apparent: 
If a man through fear of danger of death or of any other 
temporal evil is so disposed as to do what is forbidden, or 
to omit what is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is 
a mortal sin.214
 Matthew 10:24211
 Luke 22:42212
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Gawain did not prove a perfect practitioner of the law, but in admitting his fault he at 
least  showed a clear  understanding of the law. His retention of the girdle was an 
omission of what the divine law commanded.  Finally it must be stressed that every 215
action that is a response to fear should not be viewed as immoral, but only those acts 
that  are  themselves  contrary  to  virtue.  If  Gawain  had  found  himself  unable  to 
overcome all the wild beasts that he contended with in the woods, he would have 
committed no sin  in  fleeing from them. For  when fear  prompts  you towards  that 
which reason also dictates as the proper course of action, there is not sin in adhering 
to such a prompting. Aquinas reaffirms that it is in fact only sinful to act out of fear 
when the fear itself is one that urges a person towards a course of action that the 
reason apprehends as sinful: 
When the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we 
should  endure  rather  than  forfeit,   fear   is  inordinate 
and sinful. On the other hand, when the appetite fears so as 
to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is 
neither inordinate nor sinful.216
Aquinas’ delineation between those responses to fear that are sinful, and those that are 
not, closely accord with the view point of the poet, for Gawain does not condemn the 
fear that caused him to flinch beneath the Green Knight’s axe, yet he does condemn 
the fear that prompted him to break faith with his host. It is only by the end of the 
poem  that  he  comes  to  the  full  realization  of  this  truth.  And  the  force  of  this 
realization is made the more apparent because he is the only one in the story that 
realizes the moral truth. It is this ‘indeterminate’ ending that the most sense can be 
drawn from the poem.  If Gawain’s self-admonishing is looked at from too narrow a 217
perspective  than  the  poem  would  seem  a  tragedy,  ending  in  the  recognition  of 
Gawain’s moral failure through compromising his truth. 
The poem, when read in this way, is anything but tragedy. It does not conclude 
with a failure but rather a moral triumph. Such a reading of the poem does in no way 
trivialise his initial compromise, but does rather stress the moral progress he made by 
 Christian theology demands truthfulness even in the smallest matters. Omitting the truth even in a 215
matter as small as a Christmas game was still understood to be something for which one would be held 
morally culpable. Such rigid viewpoints doubtlessly had their influence from such scripture passages as 
Luke 16:10, “Whoever is faithful with very little will also be faithful with much, and whoever is 
dishonest with very little will also be dishonest with much.” 
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not making another compromise in conceding to the view point of the other knights 
who wished to trivialise his fault.  The poem would indeed have been a tragedy had 
Gawain conformed with the other knights’ morally lax view point,  but instead his 
moral growth is made apparent by contrasting it with the other knights. Those that fail 
to  see  the  necessity  of  this  final  contrast  miss  the  central  argument  of  the  poem. 
Joseph  A.  Longo  comments  upon  this  frequent  misinterpretation  of  the  poem’s 
ending:
This  impression  of  dissonance  has  been  advanced  by  those 
who  interpret  Gawain’s  final  vision  as  something  akin  to 
defeat rather than to an ethical and emotional victory.218
Longo asserts that the ending shows a triumphant Gawain that rose to a higher moral 
plane than his peers. There is, however, another way of interpreting the ending of the 
poem that resolves the discrepancies of opinion. Though the two views seem initially 
disparate to one another, J. A. Burrow puts forward an argument that reconciles them 
both:
We may recognise a degree of extravagance in Gawain’s 
assessment his failure, and still feel that he is reacting just 
as he should- grandly. As Bercilak is right to temper justice 
with mercy, so Gawain is  right not to.  The behaviour of 
each is exemplary, because each fulfils the demands of his 
particular role219
Burrow’s argument resonates with the Catholic moral thought of the middle ages, 
when  there  lived  such  saints  as  Francis  and  Dominic  who  were  known for  their 
extreme mercy towards others  and severity  towards themselves.  They showed the 
greatest tenderness towards every social outcast, yet called themselves the greatest of 
sinners.  That one ought to show mercy and forbearance towards the faults of others 220
but not oneself was a particularly prevalent view among the Scholastic theologians of 
the high middle ages,  and the influence of this ethical view is practically apparent 221
in  the  conclusion  of  the  poem.  This  ‘double  standard’ does  much  to  explain  the 
 Joseph A. Longo, ‘Sir Gawain and the Green Knight’ The Christian quest for perfection 218
(Nottingham Medieval Studies 1967), 58.
 Burrow, A Reading, 144.219
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discrepancy between Gawain’s severe attitude towards his fault leniency of the other 
knights. Their merciful attitude need not reflect a moral inferiority. It might be argued 
that they were in fact simply showing that mercy which is fitting for a Christian to 
show to another who has sinned.  222
Conclusion 
This disparity of thought between modern and medieval ethics shows once more the 
need for uncovering a deeper understanding of the world view that influenced the 
Gawain poet. It is evident that the complex treatment of morality that SGGK offers 
cannot hope to be properly understood and evaluated unless the modern reader first 
becomes  familiar  with  ethical  views  that  influenced  the  Gawain-poet.  The  poem 
offers a glimpse into the medieval worldview, and yet that glimpse remains enigmatic 
until the broader context and moral frame work, within which the poem operates, is 
more  perfectly  understood.  It  is  only  then  that  the  moral  complexities  and  the 
seemingly indeterminate ending begin to make sense to the reader. For instance, in 
discovering the precision with which the virtues of fortitude and temperance were 
defined  by  medieval  thinkers,  one  begins  to  understand  how  the  poet  used  his 
narrative  to  make  explicit  these  moral  distinctions.  Furthermore  the  fidelity  that 
Gawain maintains towards his Christmas game promises,  assume a less ridiculous 
light when the poet’s intention is made apparent to highlight the moral imperative of 
maintaining  your  word  irrespective  of  circumstances.  These,  and  the  many  other 
points  addressed  in  my  thesis,  highlight  the  need  for  uncovering  a  deeper 
understanding of the moral thought of the poet, and this understanding may not hope 
to be achieved without reference to the preeminent thinkers of that medieval period, 
that is to say the Scholastics. The frequent references made throughout this thesis to 
Thomas Aquinas’ moral theology have not been inserted in order to lend credibility to 
this argument, they have rather been looked to because they offer the most coherent 
explanation for analysing the poem of SGGK. 
 Henri J. M. Nouwen, Life of the Beloved: Spiritual Living in a Secular World (London: Crossroad 222
pub. Co, 2002), 15.
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His  detailed  analysis  of  moral  philosophy  provides  the  framework  necessary  for 
understanding the poems underlying themes.
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